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ANTITRUST SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GERMAN AND
JAPANESE LAW
John 0. Haley*
I. INTRODUCTION
A perceived failure of enforcement was a major theme in discussion of
antitrust policy in both the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan dur-
ing the 1970's. German critics charged that antitrust violations were in-
creasingly being viewed as a Kavaliersdelikt, a peccadillo, not deserving
much more than a slap on the wrist.1 In Japan, on the other hand, the
1947 antitrust statute, one of the most stringent in the world on its face,
seemed in its enforcement to be little more than a moribund vestige of
Occupation reforms. 2 Such concerns led to proposals and ultimately leg-
islative action to reinforce the available sanctions of both the German
* Associate Dean and Professor, University of Washington School of Law. The author owes a
debt of appreciation to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for its support of the research on the
enforcement of German antitrust law in 1981 at the Institute for Economic Law, Labor, and Social
Insurance Law of the Albert-Ludwigs University in Freiburg im Breisgau. A special debt is owed to
Professor Dr. Fritz Rittner and Klaus Blemer for their assistance on German law, and to Professor
Akira Shbda of Keio University, and Hiroshi Iyori and Hideto Ishida of the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission, on the Japanese side. They helped to ferret out many errors in earlier drafts. The author
is solely responsible for those that remain.
1. An article by Professor Jtirgen Baumann and Gunther Arzt in 1970 was one of the first aca-
demic expressions of concern with the issue of whether antitrust violations had become in effect
minor, excusable offenses and therefore harsher sanctions were necessary. Baumann & Arzt, Kar-
tellrecht und allgemeines strafrechtst, 134 ZEITSCHRiFr FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRT-
SCHAFrSRECHT [ZHR] 24 (1970). The authors argued for the imposition of criminal penalties for most
antitrust violations. This article was the catalyst for intense academic and political debate. The issue
was a principal theme in the 49th Conference of German Jurists in 1972. For the proceedings of the
conference, see generally VERHANDLUNGEN DES 49 DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES (1972). For the views
expressed at the Conference by Professor Klaus Tiedemann, one of the panelists and principal propo-
nents of criminalization of German antitrust law, see K. TIEDEMANN. WELCHE STRAFrRECHTLICHE
M=rr'L EMPFEHLEN SICH FOR EINE WIRKSAME BEKAMPFUNG DER WIRTSCHAFrSKRIMINALrrAT? (1972).
See also Kartte & von Portius, Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts, 1975 BETRIEBSBERATOR [BB]
1169, 1169 n. I. The Federal Minister of Justice responded as noted infra note 16, by appointing a
special commission to study the issue of criminal sanctions for antitrust violations in the context of
criminal law reforms to prevent various economic offenses.
2. See, e.g., Zadankai, Korekara no dokusen kinshi seisaku (Panel discussion: Antimonopoly
policy for tomorrow), 253 K6sEt TORIHtKI 4 (1972). For a summary of the background to the 1977
Japanese antitrust amendments, see Recent Developments: Antimonopoly Law-Review of Continu-
ing Efforts to Strengthen Japan's Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Preser-
vation of Fair Trade, 9 LAW IN JAPAN 157 (1976). For a brief history of the statute and its Occupation
origins, see infra note 6.
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Law Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) in 19803 and the Japanese
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law in 1977.4
With respect to remedies and sanctions the 1980 GWB amendments
and the 1977 Japanese amendments were remarkably similar, the legisla-
tion in both countries including provisions relating to statutory surcharges
to prevent offenders from profiting from illegal cartels, even after pay-
ment of fines, and increasing tenfold the maximum statutory fines. The
amendments and the discussion that preceded them, especially in the Fed-
eral Republic, brought into clearer view not only the role of penalties in
coercing compliance with substantive legal standards, but also the limits
of law as defined by the available penalties. Examination of the sanctions
and remedies of German and Japanese antitrust law thus yields insights
beyond the issue of antitrust enforcement. It highlights features of the
German and Japanese legal systems that are often obscured by focus on
substantive law and raises fundamental questions as to the nature and role
of sanctions in any legal order.
The legal systems of the Federal Republic and Japan have much in
common. The basic institutions and concepts of German civil, criminal,
and administrative law provided the principal models for Japan's legal
reforms during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 5 Con-
temporary legislation and doctrinal changes in the Federal Republic also
continue to influence Japanese legal developments. Despite the American
origins of Japanese antitrust legislation, which was drafted by Americans
and imposed during the Occupation on a less than enthusiastic Japanese
3. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinkungen [GWB], 1957 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 1 1081,
as amended through the Novelle (amendment) of Apr. 26, 1980, Viertes Gesetz zur Anderung des
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinkungen, 1980 BGBI I 458. One of the best and most recent
English translations including the 1980 amendments is in A. RIESENKAMPFF & J. CRES, LAW AGAINST
RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION WITH 1980 AMENDMENTS (1981) [hereinafter cited as RISENKAMPFF
(1981)]. a supplement to the translation and commentary published in 1977 as A. RIESENKAMPFF & J.
CRES. LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION (both in English and German) [hereinafter cited as
RIESENKAMPFF (1977)]. Other translations include R. MUELLER & H. SCHNEIDER. THE GERMAN LAW
AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION (1973); B5 K. STOCKMANN & V. STRAUCH. WORLD LAW OF
COMPETITION app. 1 (1983); and 2 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
GUIDETO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES "Germany" (1981).
4. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi k6sei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h6ritsu (Law concerning
the prohibition of private monopoly and preservation of fair trade), (Law No. 54, 1947, as amended
through Law No. 63, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law]. The best and
most up-to-date translation into English is in ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN 3-62 (M. Naka-
gawa ed. 1984). For detailed commentary in English, see generally 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN pt. 9
(Z. Kitagawa ed. 1981), and H. IYORI & A. UESUGI. JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN
(1983).
5. For one of the best accounts of the historical developments of modem Japanese law and its
German antecedents, see Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law,
1868-1961, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 5 (A. von Mehren ed.
1963).
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government, 6 the influence of German law and practice on Japanese anti-
trust law, at least since 1953, has been profound. The 1952 government
draft7 of the German GWB, for example, provided the basis for the most
important changes in the Japanese Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law in
1953: the inclusion of recession (fukyd) and rationalization (g6rika) car-
tels. 8 Perhaps more important, the Japanese statute is enforced within
procedural contexts-both administrative and criminal-patterned after
German law. As a result, today Japanese antitrust law can be understood
accurately only when read in terms of German rather than American prac-
tice.
Both the German and Japanese antitrust statutes set forth an impressive
array of penalties and sanctions against antitrust violations. They include
administrative fines, private damage actions, and, in the case of Japan,
criminal penalties. In practice, however, few have been effective as de-
terrents. As discussed below, the reasons for this relate in part to limita-
tions inherent to individual types of penalties, but certain basic features of
both legal systems also contribute. Compensating at least in part for the
weakness of formal sanctions, however, is the deterrent effect of adverse
publicity.
The principal formal sanctions under both statutes are administrative
fines, of which the most significant is an administratively determined sur-
charge to recapture the proceeds of illegal conduct, which resulted from
recent amendments to both the GWB and the Antimonopoly and Fair
Trade Law. The Japanese statute provides for criminal penalties, al-
6. Japanese antitrust legislation dates from the enactment in 1947 of the Antimonopoly and Fair
Trade Law as part of the Allied Occupation efforts to promote the "economic democratization" of
Japan. The statute was subsequently amended in 1949 to eliminate features considered even by Occu-
pation authorities as either too stringent or unworkable. As the Occupation ended in May 1952, the
Japanese government almost immediately moved toward amendment to weaken the statute further.
The result was the 1953 amendments, which left the basic features of the law intact but added several
critical exemptions for recession (fuky6) and rationalization (gorika) cartels and a system of autho-
rized resale price maintenance. Although the amendments themselves did not significantly impair an
effective antitrust policy, they signalled the beginning of a decade of weak enforcement. For a
concise account in Japanese, see I A. SHODA. DOKUSEN KINSHI HO (Antimonopoly law) 4 (2d ed.
1980); more detailed description is provided in K(Os TORIHIKI I'INKAI, DOKUSEN KINSHI SEISAKU
NIJUONENSHI (Twenty-year history of antimonopoly policy) (1968) [hereinafter cited as TwENTY-YEAR
HISTORY] and the companion volume, KOSEI TORIHIKI I'INKAI. DOKUSEN KINSHI SEISAKU SANJONENSHI
(Thirty-year history of antimonopoly policy) (1977). For discussion in English of the background and
controversy over Occupation antitrust policies, see generally T.A. BISSON. ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION IN
JAPAN (1954); E. HADLEY, ANTrriusT IN JAPAN (1970); and K. YAMAMURA. ECONOMIC POLICY IN
POSTWAR JAPAN (1967).
7. Regierungsentwurf, reprinted with official comments in H. MOLLER & P. GIESSLER. KOMMEN-
TAR ZUM GESETZGEGEN WETBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN apps. A & B. (Ist ed. 1958). For an English
version of the bill with abbreviated translation of the official comments, see ANTI-TRusT LAWS: A
COMPARATIVE SYMPosIuM 189-237 (W. Friedmann ed. 1956).
8. See H. IYORI & A. UESuGI. supra note 4, at 15.
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though, to anticipate subsequent discussion, there has been only one sig-
nificant criminal prosecution. German law differs in not subjecting
antitrust violations to criminal sanctions. Rather, antitrust violations are
treated as Ordnungswidrigkeiten, administrative or regulatory offenses. 9
As such they are subject to administrative fine proceedings but not crimi-
nal actions. Finally, both statutes provide for civil (nontreble) damage
actions. Judicial construction of the GWB and difficulties of proof in both
German and Japanese law have diminished (in the Federal Republic) or
essentially eliminated (in Japan) the efficacy of damage actions as a deter-
rent.
The concept of an equity power to fashion nonstatutory remedies in
order to provide effective relief is alien to both German and Japanese no-
tions of judicial and administrative power. The traditional view in the
Federal Republic is that all remedies and sanctions must have specific
statutory basis. 10 Consequently, the antitrust enforcement authorities in
the Federal Republic are restricted to the limited remedial powers-prohi-
bition orders-and sanctions delineated in the GWB. In Japan, the gen-
eral language in the Japanese Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law, based
on American concepts, empowers the Japanese enforcement authorities
"to take any other measures necessary to eliminate acts in violation" of
various prohibitions,"I but does not give the authorities the breadth of
remedial power that a corresponding grant of equity power would give an
American administrative agency.
Nor do courts or administrative agencies in the Federal Republic or
Japan have general contempt power. In the case of the Federal Republic
there is an apparent but little used analog, 12 but not in Japan. A violation
of a court or administrative order may be subject by statute in specific
instances to criminal penalty, but, as explained in detail below, this pre-
sents a variety of special obstacles. Consequently, the Federal Republic
and Japan share a common weakness in antitrust enforcement-the lack
of effective legal sanctions-with a common result: an administrative il-
9. Criminal procedure scholar John Langbein uses the term "petty infractions" for Ordnnngswi-
drigkeiten. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany. 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439.
451 (1974). Because such offenses are not necessarily minor and the procedures for levying fines are
administrative, not criminal, the translations "administrative" or "regulatory" offenses seem prefer-
able. The standard Japanese translation is chiitsujo ihan (offense against public order), construing the
term Ordnung as "'public order" rather than "regulation." The English term the author has adopted
conveys more accurately the sense of the term if not its literal meaning.
10. See GRUJNDGESETZ [GG] art. 103(2) (W. Ger.).
11. Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law arts. 7(1), 8-2(1), 17-2(1), 20.
12. ZIVILPROZEBORDNUNG [ZPO] § 890 (W. Ger.) provides for a maximum fine of 500,000 DM
(approximately $250,000 at prevailing rates) and imprisonment for six months for violations of court
orders. It is made applicable to administrative orders under VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG
[VwGO1 § 167 (W. Ger.).
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legal proceeds surcharge has become the most effective statutory sanc-
tion, while adverse publicity is the most effective actual deterrent.
II. CRIMINAL VS. ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES
On the face of the German and Japanese antitrust statutes, the most
salient difference in sanctions between the two is that German law uses
administrative fines instead of criminal sanctions. This difference is of
little significance in practice, however, because of the dearth of criminal
actions in Japan, as discussed in detail below. The debate over the cri-
minalization of German antitrust law illustrates the special limitations im-
posed by German criminal procedure on the use of criminal sanctions to
enforce regulatory measures. The Japanese experience, however, points
to more general hurdles to their effective use at least in the antitrust con-
text.
A. German Law
No violation of the GWB is punishable as a criminal offense. Instead,
the GWB lists a series of particular violations deemed regulatory infrac-
tions, or Ordnungswidrigkeiten, subject to fines levied pursuant to the
Law on Regulatory Offenses (OWiG). 13 The introduction of criminal
sanctions, however, has long been an issue. The "Josten draft,"1 4 which
provided the basis for the government's 1952 bill that resulted in the
GWB as enacted in 1957, relied principally on criminal sanctions. 15 More
recently, a special commission appointed in 1972 by the Federal Ministry
of Justice' 6 recommended that horizontal price-fixing and other agree-
13. Gesetz fiber Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OWiG], 1968 BGBI 1481. For an excellent description
of the law and its operation in English, see Schneider, The German Code of Regulatory Offenses, in
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 253 (E. Wise & G. Mueller eds. 1975).
14. Entwurf zu einem Gesetz zur Sicherung des Leistungswettbewerbs und zu einem Gesetz fiber
das Monopolamt (manuscript copy, Library, Faculty of Law, Freiburg University) [hereinafter cited
as Josten draft], which was submitted by the Frankfurt-based Verwaltung fur Wirtshaft, headed by
Ludwig Erhard. It is known as the "Josten draft" for Paul Josten, former head of the cartel control
office of the Ministry of Economics during the Weimar Republic and chairman of the drafting com-
mittee, which was comprised of Walter Bauer, Franz Brhm, Wilhelm Ktppel, Wilhelm Kromphardt,
C. Fischer, and Bernard Pfister. For background on the Josten draft and the enactment of the GWB,
see Die Deutsche Kartellrechtsentwicklung 1945 bis 1957, in GESETZ GEGEN WE-rBEWERBS-
BESCHRANKUNGEN UND EUROPAISCHES KARTELLREcHT 52 (H. Miiller-Henneberg & G. Schwartz eds.
I st ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as MOLLER-HENNEBERG].
15. See, e.g., Josten Draft, supra note 14, §§ 66, 67, 68.
16. Formally entitled the Sachverstdndigen Kommission zur Bekdmpfung der Wirtschaftskrimi-
nalitlt, the commission was appointed on July 25, 1972, by the Federal Minister of Justice to study
criminal law reforms as a means to prevent economic offenses. Chaired by the Attorney-General for
Baden-Wtirttemberg in Stuttgart (Weinmann), its members included representatives from the legisla-
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ments or concerted action violative of sections 1 and 25(1) of the GWB be
treated as criminal offenses.17 This recommendation was never adopted.
The lack of criminal penalties reflects, however, not only the apparent
wishes of the government-particularly the Federal Ministry of Econom-
ics, which rejected the special commission recommendation-but also
most antitrust scholars, practitioners, and, perhaps most important, the
antitrust enforcement authorities themselves. 18 The opposition stems
from several concerns.
Foremost are certain practical procedural advantages in applying ad-
ministrative sanctions under the OWiG, or perhaps more accurately the
disadvantages of resort to the criminal process under German law. Of
central concern is the narrow discretion of the prosecutor in deciding
whether or not to prosecute a particular case. Under what is termed the
Legalitdtsprinzip, or legality principle, in theory the procuracy must pro-
secute all persons who, after investigation, are found to have committed a
criminal offense. 19 As a further check on discretion, not only can prose-
ture, the government, and the Federal Supreme Court as well as practitioners (one lawyer and one
accountant) and several leading scholars, two of whom, professors Peter Raisch (Hagen) and Peter
Ulmer (Heidelberg), were antitrust and economic law specialists, and one, criminal law professor
Klaus Tiedemann (Freiburg), the most prolific and ardent proponent of the use of criminal sanctions
to deter antitrust violations. The commission met on ten occasions from October 1972 through No-
vember 1976 and explored the greater use of criminal penalties in preventing tax evasion, computer
crimes, credit fraud, unfair competition, and consumer fraud in addition to antitrust violations. See
generally BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIz, TAGUNGSBERICHTE DER
SACHVERSTANDIGENKOMMISSION ZUR BEKAMPFUNG DER WIRTSCHAFSKRIMINALITAT (1972-76)
[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION HEARINGS].
17. BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ. I BEKAMPFUNG DER WIRT-
SCHAFrSKRIMINALITAT: KOMMISSIONSBERICHT 126 (1979).
18. With the exception of some commission members themselves, no scholar or practitioner ap-
pearing before the commission fully supported the introduction of criminal sanctions. Compare sub-
missions of commission members Tiedemann, Raisch, and Ulmer (10 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra
note 16) (supporting criminal sanctions) with submissions of Steindorff (8 id. app. 6) (opposing crim-
inal penalties) and submissions of Cramer (10 id. app. 6) (same). The Vice-President of the Federal
Cartel Office was equally unenthusiastic. See submissions of Gutzler, 8 id.; 10 id. app. 4. The current
President of the Federal Cartel Office, Wolfgang Kartte, is apparently no more supportive of the use
of criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Kartte & von Portius, supra note 1.
19. STRAFPROZEQORDNUNG ISTPO] §§ 152(2), 160, 170 (W. Ger.). For discussion in English of
the limits of prosecutorial discretion in Germany, see Damaska, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion: Comments on a German Monograph, 29 AM J. COMP L. 119 (1981); Herrmann, The Rule of
Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV
468 (1974); Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18
AM J. COMP L. 508 (1970); Langbein, supra note 9. See also Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of
Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J.
240 (1977) (maintaining that prosecutors have discretionary power to prosecute); the response
thereto, Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J.
1549 (1978) (maintaining that German prosecutors exercise little prosecutorial discretion); and the
rebuttal, Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570
(1978). Much of the argument on both sides rests on speculation for lack of empirical data. However.
a subsequent study conducted under the auspices of the Max-Planck-Institut ftir auslindisches und
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cution be activated by private complaint,20 but also a right of petition by
the victim exists for a court order requiring prosecution upon judicial
finding of sufficient evidence. 21 Despite some margin for what amounts
to a discretionary decision by the prosecutor not to prosecute, 22 in effect
German law shifts such discretion from the state to private persons in
cases where the evidence of guilt is sufficient for conviction. Nor does the
career judiciary in Germany enjoy the flexibility and room for maneuver
(i.e., discretion) of common law judges. 23 The prosecutor files the charge
and the court determines guilt, and neither has any significant discretion,
except for sentencing if guilt is proven. As a result, the complainant
rather than the prosecutor or the judge ultimately controls the imposition
of criminal sanctions. One consequence is obvious: criminal law enforce-
ment authorities are unable or less likely to select cases to prosecute based
on policy considerations-ranging from their concern over the serious-
ness of the offense, the development of judicial construction of the law,
or circumstances related to the commission of the offense or the offen-
der.24 Questions of efficiency also arise. The prosecutor loses the free-
dom to decide how to allocate resources. If all cases must be prosecuted,
prosecutorial efforts are necessarily more diffused than if concentration
on particular cases were permitted. 25 The problem is exacerbated by the
intemationales Strafrecht (Freiburg im Breisgau) fills much of this gap. See E. BLANKENBURG, K.
SESSAR & W. STEFFEN. Dm STAATSANWALTSCHAFr IM PROZEBsTRAFRECHTLICHER SOZIALKONTROLLE
(1978) (a summary in English appears at pp. 336-50) [hereinafter cited as BLANKENBURG]. On the
basis of this study, it appears Langbein and Weinreb's position that prosecutorial discretion is limited
has the better side of the debate.
20. STPO § 374. Described in English by Langbein, supra note 9, at 461-62; and Herrmann,
supra note 19, at 478.
21. STPO §§ 172-177. Langbein, supra note 9, at 463. Apparently, however, resort to such
petitions rarely if ever occurs. BLANKENBURG, supra note 19, at 347.
22. STPO §§ 153-154d. See generally Herrmann, supra note 19.
23. For a concise description of the judge's role, see Peterson's translator's note to Baur, Intro-
duction, in BIBLIOGRAPHY OF GERMAN LAW 136 (German Ass'n of Comp. Law ed. 1964). See also
Damaska, supra note 19, at 125.
24. The accuracy of this conclusion lies at the heart of the debate between Goldstein and Marcus,
who oppose the notion that in fact German prosecutors have little real discretion, and Langbein and
Weinreb, who support it. See supra note 19. But the available empirical data supports Langbein and
Weinreb's view. To quote from the Freiburg Study:
It is characteristic of the prosecutor's decision-making that he displays a marked lack of interest
in the individuals affected by his decisions .... His decisions are based on data contained in
dossiers, which are often incomplete and only rarely give useful information on the personality
of the subject. The prosecutor generally takes into account very fetv criteria to substantiate and
legitimate his decisions, and he has only very little information about the individuals who are
affected by his decision.
BLANKENBURG, supra note 19, at 343. See also T. WEIGEND, ANKLAGEPFLICHT UND ERMESsEN: DIE
STELLUNG DES STAATSANWALTS ZWISCHEN LEGALITrATS- UND OPPORTUNITATSPRINZIP NACH DEUTSCHEN
uND AMERIKANIscHEN REcrr 41 (1978).
25. The Freiburg Study provides some support for this view, although it concludes that the seri-
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fact that in 1979 there were only 3,328 procurators in the Federal Repub-
lic.26
In contrast, under the so-called Opportunitdtsprinzip, provided for in
section 47 of the OWiG, administrative authorities exercise broad prose-
cutorial discretion over which violations are actually prosecuted. The ad-
vantages of such discretion account largely for the strong preference dis-
played by antitrust enforcement officials for noncriminal sanctions. 27
Because of the economic issues involved, they argue, discretion over pro-
secution is essential to the development of sound antitrust policy.
A second consideration, however, is the difference in expertise in-
volved. The German procuracy deals exclusively with criminal actions.
In civil and administrative cases the government is represented by private
counsel or qualified lawyers from a particular agency. 28 Therefore, it is
said, the procuracy necessarily lacks exposure to the problems and issues
involved in economic regulation, especially those that underlie antitrust
actions. 29 This expertise is particularly critical at the investigative stage
of a case, which for criminal offenses is left largely to the police. 30
Also raised in objection to criminal penalties is the greater delay in-
volved in criminal cases as compared to proceedings under the OWiG. 31
At least one study gives some support for this assertion. Despite the ex-
traordinary efficiency of the German criminal process, 32 the investigation
of most economic crimes appears to take at least as long as, if not longer
than, an entire administrative proceeding under the GWB. 33
ousness of the offense is a factor in the charging decisions of German procurators. BLANKENBURG.
supra note 19, at 340.
26. BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND. 1980 STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 312.
27. See, e.g., Kartte & von Portius, supra note 1, and submissions by Gutzler, 8 COMMISSION
HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 7; 10 id. app. 4.
28. See T. WEIGEND. supra note 24, and the comments thereon by Damaska, supra note 19.
29. Although seldom expressed so baldly, the importance of expertise is apparent from the ef-
forts to deal with the problem by proponents of criminal sanctions. See, e.g., submission by Klaus
Tiedemann, 10 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. I, at 6.
30. On the role of the police in criminal investigations, see BLANKENBURG. supra note 19, at 29 1,
338.
31. See, e.g., submissions by Peter Cramer and Peter Ulmer in 10 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra
note 16, apps. 6 & 2. See also comments by Wolfgang Kartte before a seminar conducted by Profes-
sors Fritz Rittner and Klaus Tiedemann on "Antitrust Violations and Criminal Law" (Kartellrecht-
verstosse und Strafrecht) in the Law Faculty of Freiburg University, Spring Semester 1975. Com-
ments by Wolfgang Kartte of May 28, 1975, Dieter Lutz Reporter, in Seminar Records (provided to
author by Professor Fritz Rittner).
32. In one of the best empirical studies in English on the German criminal process. Professor
Gerhard Casper and Haus Zeisel determined that roughly one-half of all criminal trials last one-third
of a day or less. Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, J. LEGAL STUD 135,
149-50 (1972).
33. F. Berckhauer, Wirtschaftskriminalitit und Staatsanwaltschaft (1977) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Freiburg University).
478
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Closely related to concerns over the adverse consequences of introduc-
ing the Legalitiitsprinzip to antitrust enforcement are objections based on
the necessary imprecision in any legal definition of illegal anticompetitive
conduct. The limitations on prosecutorial discretion in German law grow
out of and reinforce the view that norms enforced by criminal sanctions
should be unambiguous and subject to uniform prosecution. In German
constitutional terms, no act may be subject to a criminal penalty unless its
illegality is described in clear and certain terms by statute before the act
has been committed. 34 German antitrust specialists argue that such con-
cepts as "concerted conduct," "restriction of competition for a common
purpose," "abuse of market power," or "anticompetitive considera-
tions" lack such certainty. 35 The fear is also expressed that the courts
would impose rigid definitions of these terms in order to meet these con-
stitutional requirements36 and that judges would be reluctant to impose
criminal sanctions. 37
Lurking in the background is a conceptual distinction between criminal
offenses and infractions of regulatory statutes introduced at the turn of the
century. 38 Although not reflected in any statutory dichotomy until the
postwar period, the notion that conduct violative of regulatory statutes or
administrative regulations is by nature conceptually distinguishable from
Criminal Code offenses provided the jurisprudential foundation in 1945
for introducing the concept Ordnungswidrigkeiten as a separate category
of unlawfulness. 39 Although today few German scholars fully accept the
validity of the argument that there is an inherent conceptual difference in
the nature of regulatory as opposed to criminal offenses, the distinction
persists out of recognition that various features of the German criminal
34. GG art. 103(2). See also WEIMAR CONSTITUTION art. 116 (Ger. 1919) (no longer in force).
35. See, e.g., Kartte & von Portius, supra note 1, at 1170. See also Gutzler, 8 COMMISSION
HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 7, at 3.
36. See, e.g., Gutzler, 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS, supra note 16, app. 7, at 8.
37. Gutzler, Die Ermittlungstltigkeit des Bundeskartellamtes, in 13/1 GRUNDLAGEN DER KRIMI-
NAtUSTIK 537 (1974).
38. The distinction was first explored in the now classic study by James Goldschmidt. J.
GOLDSCHMIDT. DAS VERWALTUNGSSTRAFRECHT (1902). Erik Wolf, however, is considered its most
persuasive and articulate conceptual explicator. Wolf, Die Stellung der Verwaltungsdelikte im
Strafrechtssystem, in BEITRAGEZUR STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT: FESTGABE FOR REINHARD VON FRANK
516-88 (1930). Eberhard Schmidt is credited with giving life to these early works in postwar legisla-
tion. The most important postwar restatement of the validity of the dichotomy in the context of eco-
nomic regulation is E. SCHMIDT, DAS NEUE WESTDEUTSCHE WIRTSCHAFrSSTRAFREcHT (1950). For a
critical analysis, see K. TiEDEMANN. KARTELLRECHTSVERSTOBE UND STRAFREctrr 99 (1976); K. TIEDE-
MANN. WETrBEWERB UND STRAFRECHT 117 (1976).
39. See, e.g., E. GOHLER, GEsErz OBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKErrEN 3-6 (4th ed. 1975); K. REB-
MANN. ROTH & HERMANN, GEsErz OBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKErrEN: KOMMENTAR, vor § 1, 6 (1968);
RoTBERG, ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKErrENGESETZ 43 (5th ed. 1975); E. S5fMIDT, supra note 38; K. TIEDE-
MANN. KARTELLRECHTSVERSTOE UIND STRAFRECHT 99 (1976); K. TIEDEMANN, WErBEWERB UND
STRAFRECTrr 117 (1976).
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process, as discussed above, are inappropriate in dealing with particular
types of unlawful conduct.
Although perhaps flawed as an exercise of conceptual jurisprudence,
the traditional justification for the dichotomy does contain an important
sociological insight. Apart from the penalties imposed, the procedures
followed, or who initiates and controls the process, a criminal action can
also be distinguished from both civil and administrative proceedings by
the social stigma that attaches to the offender. Indeed, this may be the
element that determines the efficacy of criminal sanctions. Neither the
threat nor the imposition of the penalty itself has much effect if the offen-
der is free from any stigma of having committed the offense or having
been involved in a criminal proceeding. Consequently, before any con-
duct is deemed "criminal," there should be social consensus on both so-
ciological and ethical grounds that such stigma is justified. Otherwise, the
process will be difficult to invoke, and a conviction will be difficult to
sustain, by those who have discretion (complainants, prosecutors, or
judges, or any combination thereof). To invoke the criminal process with-
out consensus that the penalty suits the wrong committed will tend to
erode the legitimacy of the criminal process and the capacity of the label
"criminal" to carry any stigma.
Consensus is all the more necessary in a pluralistic society such as the
Federal Republic where the discretion of the prosecutor and judge is nar-
rowly prescribed and there is no trial by jury. The lack of any intervening
discretionary check against prosecution forces the German legislator to
consider with care the potential scope of any criminal proscription, as
evidenced in German constitutional requirements. This need is all the
greater if a significant portion of the community condones, if not encour-
ages, the conduct in question. To the extent legislators are accountable to
the public politically, they must be sensitive to community attitudes to-
ward the wrongfulness of the conduct proscribed. The ultimate issue,
therefore, is the extent to which society views the conduct or acts in ques-
tion to be morally or socially reprehensible. As perceived in the tradi-
tional conceptual dichotomy between administrative and criminal of-
fenses in Germany, there does or should exist a qualitative difference
between criminal conduct and other unlawful behavior. This distinction is
better defined, however, in terms of community values and attitudes
rather than jurisprudential conceptualizations. Thus, the distinction is to-
day stated in terms of the "ethical" content of the offense.4 0 One would
be hard-pressed to find a better example than antitrust.
40. See Judgment of Nov. 4, 1957, Federal Sup. Ct., W. Ger., II Entscheidungen des Bundes-
gerichtshofs in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 263, 264 (1958); see also Langbein, supra note 19, at 453
(citing K. PETERS. STRAFPROZEB 31 (2d ed. 1966)). Langbein's description of the differences between
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The GWB as enacted reflected a series of political compromises. As a
matter of political reality, the statute could not have been enacted with the
criminal sanctions that had been provided in the original "Josten draft."
As acknowledged in the official comments to the government's 1952 bill,
which eliminated such criminal penalties: "In neither the German public
nor concerned business circles . . . is there at this point in time a vital
sense that contracts and business practices that restrict competition are
improper and morally wrong." ' 41 The official comments expressly left
open, however, the possibility of a change in attitudes and the strengthen-
ing of sanctions in the future, and today no opponent of criminal sanc-
tions for antitrust violations argues-at least openly-that anticompeti-
tive conduct should be treated as a Kavaliersdelikt. Yet it is clear that
even the most active supporters of strong antitrust enforcement have
doubts about the appropriateness of criminal stigma for those who violate
the GWB. 42
Finally, doubts have been expressed on both the efficacy of criminal
sanctions as a deterrent in antitrust enforcement as well as whether there
is any need for additional sanctions. 43 What is needed, it is argued, is to
make existing sanctions more effective. 44 The special commission had
before it, for example, information on the success, or lack of it, of the
American experience with criminal sanctions. 45 Nonetheless, no attempt
was made to resolve either doubt empirically. 46
On one issue there has been little if any disagreement. The maximum
fine originally fixed in the GWB of 100,000 DM (approximately 40,000
U.S. dollars at prevailing exchange rates) was much too low to have any
meaningful deterrent effect. Consequently, the provisions of the 1980
Ordnungswidrigkeiten and criminal offenses is excellent. As he notes, the distinction "reflects the
view that the essence of the criminal process is the moral condemnation attaching to its formal sanc-
tions and its procedures." Id. (footnote omitted). As noted above, supra note 9, Langbein's use of
the term "petty infractions" for Ordnungswvidrigkeiten seems less appropriate than "administrative"
or "regulatory" offenses since many, such as antitrust violations, are not minor or petty. Rather, as
explained above, criminal sanctions in such cases are considered to be impractical out of procedural
considerations or too harsh for lack of consensus as to the appropriateness of the criminal stigma.
41. BUNDESREPUBLIKDEUTSCHLAND, BEGRONDUNG DES GESETZENTWURFES, 11 BT DRUCKSACHE
1158, at 28.
42. In addition to works previously cited supra note 19, see F. RrrNER, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS
WErrIEWERBSUND KARTELLRECHT 305 (1981).
43. Steindorff, 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 6, reprinted as Steindorff,
Gesetzgeberische Maglichkeiten zu verbesserterDurchsetzung des GWB, 138 ZHR 504(1974).
44. Gutzler, 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 7.
45. Steindorff, 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 6 (citing works by Packer, Elzinga,
and Breit, and other American studies).
46. Professor Tiedemann offered the only concrete examples of the failure of sanctions to pro-
vide an effective deterrent. He simply details, however, a number of antitrust decisions to show that
the fines were insignificant relative to the violation. Tiedemann, 10 COMMISSION HEARINGS, supra
note 16, app. 1.
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amendments on section 38(4) increased the limit tenfold to one million
DM or treble any gain realized as a result of illegal conduct. This is the
illegal proceeds surcharge that will be discussed below. The result was to
raise the maximum fine to the original level provided in the government's
1952 Bill. 47 The principal factor taken into consideration in the amount
actually levied is the size of the respondent enterprise. 48
Note in addition that under German law criminal sanctions and admin-
istrative fines require the same evidentiary burden for conviction. For
both, in the case of proceedings against natural persons, proof is neces-
sary not only of individual responsibility but also of willful or negligent
conduct in violating the law. 49
B. Japanese Law
In the area of sanctions, the Japanese depart in significant respects from
both German and American patterns. Not having adopted the strict con-
trols of German law over prosecutorial discretion, the Japanese have not
had to create a system of noncriminal and therefore discretionary admin-
istrative offenses. 50 Not having a substitute for contempt, they forego the
civil enforcement alternative of American practice and are left to rely on
criminal sanctions. If criminal prosecution in any society, as we have
noted in Germany, is an unwieldy tool for antitrust enforcement, in Japan
it is even less useful. Japan is consequently left with an extraordinarily
weak system of law enforcement. 51
1. Criminal Penalties
The principal statutory sanctions against antitrust violations in Japan
47. For a brief description of the political decision by the government not to follow the Josten
draft in all respects, especially to limit the maximum fine (and eliminate criminal sanctions), see
MILLER-HENNEBERG. supra note 14, at 661 (portion written by Mayer-Wegelin). Unless a higher line
is expressly allowed by other statutes, the maximum administrative fine under the OWiG is 1000 DM
(about $500 at prevailing exchange rates). OWiG § 17(1).
48. Judgment of Oct. 7. 1959 (Nullpreis II), Federal Sup. Ct., W. Ger., WIRTSCHAFI UND WETr-
BEWERB/ENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMLUNG BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [WuW/E BGH] 352, 353.
49. See Gutzler, 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 7, at 36.
50. It might be noted that in the 1940's, Japan's celebrated institutional and administrative law
scholar. Tatsukichi Minobe, introduced the German distinction between administrative and criminal
offenses. See. e.g., T. MINOBE. KEIZAI KItIHO NO KISO RIRON (The theoretical basis for economic crim-
inal law) (1944). His observations made hardly a ripple, and have been almost totally ignored be-
cause the underlying need for the dichotomy, the legalititsprinzip, was one of the few major ele-
ments of German law the Japanese did not borrow.
51. See Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay, on Law without Sanctions. 8 J.
JAPANESE STUD 265 (1982).
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are criminal penalties. Except for possible imprisonment, they are mild.52
The highest criminal fine permitted is five million yen (approximately
20,000 U.S. dollars at prevailing exchange rates) for private monopoliza-
tion and unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of articles 3 and 8.
Violations of the prohibitions against holding companies, unlawful share-
holding, and interlocking directorships and officerships, as well as failure
to file required reports, are subject to a maximum fine of two million yen
(8,000 U.S. dollars). Failure to comply-with an FTC order and conclu-
sion of an illegal international agreement are subject to fines not to exceed
three million yen (12,000 U.S. dollars). As to imprisonment, a maximum
term of three years can be imposed for private monopolization and unrea-
sonable restraints under article 3. Unlawful holding companies, share-
holding violations, and unlawful interlocking directorates and officer-
ships carry a maximum term of one year, and conclusion of an unlawful
international agreement a maximum term of two years. Imprisonment
cannot be imposed for failure to file a report.
The 1977 amendments increased the maximum amount of all fines in
the statute to their current levels. Prior to the amendment they were one-
tenth of the current amount. The maximum fine for illegal price-fixing,
for example, was only 500,000 yen (approximately 2,000 U.S. dollars at
prevailing exchange rates).
No criminal sanction is imposed for unfair business practices, despite
inclusion for amendment of such penalty in the 1974 proposals by the Fair
Trade Commission (FTC), the sole Japanese antitrust enforcement
agency. This was the only major feature of the original FTC proposal not
enacted in 1977. The significance of its deletion is evident in the Com-
mission's reliance on the proscription against unfair business practices in
articles 19, 8, and 6 as the principal mechanism to police antitrust viola-
tions other than the most blatant cases of horizontal price-fixing or output
restrictions.
Unique to the Japanese system are the provisions giving the FTC the
exclusive right to file criminal charges under the law, 53 and giving the
Tokyo High Court exclusive jurisdiction to try criminal antitrust ac-
tions. 54 Criminal actions are thus initiated solely by the FTC. They are,
however, subject not only to FTC discretion to prosecute, but also general
prosecutorial discretion enjoyed by the Japanese procuracy. 55 The critical
feature of Japanese antitrust enforcement that reduces the deterrent effect
of criminal sanctions, however, is not lack of severity but atrophy. In
52. Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law arts. 87 to 91-2.
53. Id. art. 96.
54. Id. art. 85.
55. KEUI SOSH6H6 (Code of criminal procedure) (Law No. 131, 1948) art. 248.
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over thirty-five years only six criminal actions have been brought for anti-
trust violations, three of which were brought in 1949:56 K5sei Torihiki
I'inkai v. Okawa K.K., 57 Kcsei Torihiki I'inkai v. Yamaichi Shken
K.K. ,58 K~sei Torihiki I'inkai v. Nerin Renraku Ky6grkai,59 K~sei Tori-
hiki I'inkai v. Sanintochi K.K., 60 Kuni [Japan] v. Sekiyu Renmei,61 and
Kuni [Japan] v. Idemitsu K~san K.K. 62
The Okawa case involved failure to obey an FTC order to dispose of
corporate stock. It was dismissed prior to trial in the general amnesty at
the end of the Occupation. The facts are not reported. The complete facts
of the Yamaichi Sheken case are also unreported. Not prosecuted at the
procurator's discretion, it apparently involved alleged violations of the
restrictions on mergers and acquisitions of articles 15 and 16. The third
action against Nrrin Renraku Kyrgrkai concerned violations of the 1948
Trade Association Law63 (repealed in 1953). The nature of the violations
are not clear from the reported decision, but the association was found
guilty and fined 10,000 yen (approximately 40 U.S. dollars at prevailing
exchange rates). Two individual defendants were fined a mere 500 yen (2
U.S. dollars). The first prosecution after the end of the Occupation was a
1969 case against a real estate firm, Sanintochi K.K., for unfair advertis-
ing in selling lots in surburban Tokyo in violation of articles 90(3) and 95
of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law as well as articles 4, 6 and 9(1)
of the Unfair Premiums and Misleading Representations Prevention
Law, 64 which is also enforced by the FTC. The company was fined
200,000 yen (800 U.S. dollars) and an individual defendant was fined
100,000 yen (400 U.S. dollars) and sentenced to imprisonment for one
year, suspended with three years probation. 65
The most important criminal enforcement actions brought by the FTC
to date were the 1974 actions, involving price-fixing and output restric-
tions for domestic petroleum products. In 1974 the FTC filed criminal
56. The account of early criminal antitrust cases in Japan is based on Stephen F. Clayton, Crimi-
nal Prosecution of Antitrust Violations in Japan (1982) (unpublished seminar paper, University of
Washington) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
57. (Tokyo High Ct., May 12, 1953), noted in TWENTY-YEAR HISTORY. supra note 6, at 107.
58. Procuratorial decision not to prosecute, Dec. 28, 1952, noted in TWENTY-YEAR HISTORY.
supra note 6, at 107.
59. 17 ShinketsushfU 244 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 2, 1951).
60. 17 Shinketsushf6 232 (Tokyo High Ct., Jan. 29, 1972).
61. 983 HANREI Ji16 22 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 28, 198). For comment and partial translation.
see Ramseyer, The Oil Cartel Criminal Cases: Translations and Postscript, 15 LAW IN JAPAN 57,
57-72 (1982) (15 LAW IN JAPAN is a symposium on the Oil Cartel Cases).
62. 985 HANREI JIHO 3 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 28, 1980). For comment and partial translation,
see Ramseyer, supra note 61, at 66-75.
63. Jigyo dantai h6 (Law No. 191, 1948, repealed by Law No. 259, 1953).
64. Fut6 keihinrui oyobi fut6 hyflji brshi h6 (Law No. 134, 1962).
65. 17 Shinketsushfi 232, 233.
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charges against the Sekiyu Renmei (Petroleum Industry Federation) and
two other defendants for output restrictions and the twelve Japanese oil
companies and fourteen individuals for price-fixing. The prosecutions re-
sulted in acquittals in the output restriction case for lack of criminal in-
tent, but in convictions for price-fixing, making these cases the most im-
portant antitrust actions that have been brought in Japan. The corporate
defendants were fined between 1.5 and 2.5 million yen,66 and the individ-
ual defendants were sentenced from ten to six months in prison, sus-
pended with two years probation. 67
The Tokyo High Court decisions, handed down in September 1980,
were promptly hailed as landmark cases. 68 Never before had antitrust of-
fenders in Japan been so severely punished. Moreover, in both cases the
defendants' illegal activities had been carried out with the overt approval
and supervision by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) pursuant to special legislation to stabilize the supply of pe-
troleum. 69 Finding that the defendants in the output restriction case had
acted as a result of close MITI supervision and guidance under an errone-
ous assumption that their conduct was lawful, the court held the defen-
dants lacked the requisite criminal intent for conviction. 70 In the price-
fixing case the court found that MITI had acquiesced but not mandated
the agreement to raise prices, hence the illegality of the arrangements re-
sulted in convictions. 71 Only the price-fixing case was appealed, and on
66. Idemitsu K6san K.K. and Nihon Sekiyu K.K. were fined 2.5 million yen (approximately
$10,000). Taiy6 Sekiyu K.K. was fined 1.5 million yen ($6,000), and the remaining nine companies
were fined 2 million yen ($8,000). Ramseyer, supra note 61, at 66.
67. The individual defendants were all high-level managers. The heaviest sentences (10 months)
were meted out to Jun'ichi Sait6, director and former head of Idemitsu's sales department, and Ichi-
yuki Okada, who had a similar position with Nihon Sekiyu. Ramseyer, supra note 61, at 66.
68. Few antitrust cases in Japan have produced as much commentary. See articles in Japanese
cited in the bibliography to Symposium, 15 LAW IN JAPAN 99 app. A. (1982).
69. Sekiyugy6 h6 (Petroleum industry law) (Law No. 128, 1962).
70. The decisions did not reflect a significant change in the law as to the effect of administrative
guidance. Prior Commission decisions had consistently held that administrative guidance, even if
itself lawful, did not provide an exemption from antitrust proscription. The "guidance cartels" of the
1960's and early 1970's were long recognized as the means used by MITI and major industries to
evade the institution of Japan's antitrust law following the defeat of the 1958 amendments. See, e.g.,
T. NAKAMURA. THE POSTWAR JAPANESE ECONOMY 48 (1981). Nonetheless, their overt use had begun
to endow them with a sort of de facto legitimacy, especially for foreign observers. See, e.g., W.
PAPE. GYOSEISHIDO UND DAS ANTI-MONOPOL-GESETZ IN JAPAN (1980). The decision did, however,
take many scholars by surprise in accepting mistake as to the law as an exculpatory excuse. See
Itakura, Sekiyu yami karuterujiken keiji hanketsu no igi (Significance of the secret oil cartel criminal
decision), 361 K6sEt TORIHIKI 24 (1980). The court adopted an argument first put forth by Professor
Hideo Fujiki, in Fujiki, Gy6sei shid5 to dokkin h4 ihan no tsumi (Administrative guidance and the
crime of antimonopoly law violations), 566 JURIsuTo 46 (1974).
71. Ramseyer, supra note 61, at 72.
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February 24, 1984, the Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed the High Court's judgment. 72
Despite the impact of the Oil Cartel cases, one can reasonably doubt
whether criminal sanctions are likely to prove effective in Japan in the
long run. The oil industry was an exceptionally apt target, particularly in
the early 1970's. It did not enjoy the level of general support given to
most manufacturing and service industries in Japan from labor or the pub-
lic. Moreover, the actions were brought during a period of acute inflation
for which rising oil prices were blamed. Although, as in the United States
in the wake of the 1960 electrical equipment conspiracy cases, 73 the Oil
Cartel cases produced in Japan a heightened awareness of the criminality
of antitrust violations and the potential for prosecution, such sensitivity
will not necessarily endure. In the United States, as Elzinga and Breit
note, the prediction that "antitrust would never be the same again"
proved false. 74 They echo in particularized terms the concern of German
lawmakers over community consensus as to the criminality of antitrust
violations in concluding that-
until judges and juries are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
well-dressed, wealthy, articulate pillar of the community facing them is in
actuality the real instigator and director of a conspiracy to cut back produc-
tion, rig prices, and rob consumers and taxpayers just as effectively as a
common mugger or bank robber, it is unlikely that prison sentences often
will be imposed for violation of the antitrust laws. 75
If the criminal penalties are not a realistic deterrent to corporate immo-
rality, as Elzinga and Breit conclude for the United States, there seems
little chance for their efficacy in Japan.
The effective use of criminal sanctions to control corporate conduct in
Japan is an impossible task. Criminal prosecutions engender severe politi-
cal and intra-agency conflict as a result of the clientele relationship be-
tween each economic ministry and the industries within its jurisdiction.
Resort to criminal actions is similarly precluded except in rare instances
by the social density that results from the intricate personal ties that con-
nect the leaders of Japanese business, politics, and bureaucracy.
Institutional limitations are also a factor. The members of the FTC are
cabinet appointees and have since 1953 come exclusively from the ranks
of government officials, especially the Ministry of Finance and its affili-
72. Idemitsu Kosan v. Kumi, - Keish6a -(Sup. C., 2d P.B., February 24, 1984).
73. See generally J. HERLING. THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST VIO-
LATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY (1962).
74. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT. THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 32
(1976).
75. Id. at 43.
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ated agencies. 76 They are subject, therefore, to political pressures, and
their monopoly of the right to file a criminal charge is exercised with great
caution. In addition, the Japanese procuracy must also exercise its wide
legal discretion to prosecute. There are less than 2,200 prosecutors in Ja-
pan, 77 roughly half as many per capita as in the Federal Republic, 78 to
handle all criminal and administrative litigation. Winnowing cases by
means of broad prosecutorial discretion is thus a necessity. Although the
rate of convictions in criminal cases is 99.99 percent, 79 the rate of prose-
cution averages only 67 percent. 80 For statutory crimes the rate of prose-
cution is a mere 33 percent and less than 20 percent for crimes involving
public officials. 8' Similar discretion over sentencing is exercised by
judges; less than 2 percent of all of those who are convicted are ever im-
prisoned. Judges regularly suspend over two-thirds of all jail sentences.
The criminal justice system in Japan does not operate as a penalty-impos-
ing process but a corrective one in which defendants are given the oppor-
tunity and incentive to repent, compensate the victims, and be ab-
solved. 82 As a consequence of each of these factors it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that were the FTC suddenly to initiate prosecutions on a
regular basis, the most likely outcome would be a drastic change in the
law itself, rather than success.
2. General Remedial Powers
Unlike the GWB, the Japanese antitrust statute provides for open ended
remedial powers rather than fines as the primary enforcement mechanism.
The Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law expressly grants the FTC broad
powers to order all corrective actions necessary to eliminate violations.
These are contained in a cluster of provisions added by amendment in
1949 in relation to specific prohibitions. Article 7, for example, gives the
Commission the authority to order a party in violation of the proscriptions
against private monopolization and unreasonable restraints of trade in ar-
ticle 3 to cease ,and desist the violation, to report corrective measures
taken, to transfer part of a violating firm's business, and to take "any
other measures necessary to eliminate such acts in violation." An innova-
76. Rabinowitz, Antitrust in Japan, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN
AND EAST ASIA 106, 107 (J. Haley ed. 1978).
77. See D. HENDERSON & J. HALEY. LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 438 (1978).
78. See supra note 26.
79. Haley, supra note 51, at 270.
80. Dando, System of Discretionary Prosecution in Japan, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 525 (1970). See
also JAPAN, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 11, 12, 19, 55 (1978).
81. See Haley, supra note 51, at 270-71.
82. Id. at 269-71.
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tion of the 1977 amendments, article 8-4, gives the Commission power to
order divestiture and other structural changes to deal with monopoly
power. Article 20 contains a similar provision with respect to unfair busi-
ness practices, and since 1977 the Commission has had the authority to
delete clauses constituting an unfair business practice from contracts. Ar-
ticle 8-2 provides for similar measures to remedy violations by trade asso-
ciations as well as authority to dissolve the offending association. Under
article 17-2(1) companies and juridical persons in violation of the pro-
scriptions against excessive or illegal intercorporate shareholding and il-
legal mergers may be required to file reports, dispose of any stock held in
violation of the statute, transfer a part of the offending company's busi-
ness, and take other necessary measures to eliminate the violation. Article
17-2(2) gives the Commission similar power to correct illegal interlock-
ing directorates and officerships, and article 18 permits the FTC to bring a
civil action (in the Tokyo High Court) to have illegal holding companies
or mergers declared null and void. These powers have been more re-
stricted in practice, however, than they appear on the face of the statute.
First, the scope of FTC orders is narrow. Mandated remedial measures
in a decision are considered legally binding only with respect to the viola-
tions set out in the facts of the decision. If the decision refers to an illegal
price-fixing agreement concluded on March 31, 1985, and orders the re-
spondents to eliminate that violation, it would not necessarily apply to an
identical agreement concluded the next day on April 1, 1985. Thus the
FTC has been forced to bring consecutive actions against the same re-
spondents to eliminate what was in technical legal terms a series of sep-
arate agreements to fix prices but to the businessman simply a single
price-fixing arrangement formally confirmed after each successive FTC
decision.83
A second limitation is that without effective sanctions to enforce
compliance, the FTC is left with little other than adverse publicity to in-
sure its orders are followed. Apparently, the FTC has never attempted to
impose a criminal fine for violation of an order. In addition to criminal
fines, the statute provides for administrative fines for failure to comply.
with FTC decisions 84 and court injunctions, 85 but the amounts are fixed at
levels that do not operate as a deterrent. Since 1977 the maximum fine
under article 97 has been 500,000 yen (approximately 2,000 U.S. dollars
83. See, e.g., In re Asahi Kasei Kenzai K.K., 23 ShinketsushO 30 (FTC [Recommendation] No.
12. June 14, 1976); In re Asahi Kasei Kenzai K.K., 24 Shinketsushii 62 (FTC [Recommedation] No.
18, November 28, 1977). For discussion and statistics on repeat offenders, see Yamamura, Success
that Soured: Adminstrative Guidance and Cartels in Japan, in POLICY AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY 77, 90 n. 16 (K. Yamamura ed. 1980).
84. Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law art. 97.
85. Id. art. 86.
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at prevailing rates), an increase from 50,000 yen (200 U.S. dollars). The
maximum fine under article 98 is now 300,000 yen (1,200 U.S. dollars),
an increase from 30,000 yen (120 U.S. dollars). Rarely if ever invoked,
these provisions therefore do not offer an effective substitute for the con-
tempt power. This failure of those who drafted the law to appreciate the
underlying deficiency caused by the lack of contempt power in the Japa-
nese legal system is best revealed in their provision for judicial injunctive
relief.
3. Judicial Injunctive Relief
Clearly with American models in mind, the American drafters of the
1947 statute empowered the Tokyo High Court to issue, upon application
by the FTC, a temporary ifijunction against acts suspected to be in viola-
tion of the law when found to be a matter of urgent necessity. 86 Such a
provision makes little technical sense in the Japanese legal system. Court
injunctions are used in the United States in order to obtain the sanction of
contempt for noncompliance with a judicial order. This sanction is not
available for the enforcement of administrative orders. As in the United
States, an order by the FTC itself is technically equally as effective as a
court injunction, because an administrative order is as legally binding as a
court order. Unlike the United States, in Japan there is no contempt
power behind either type of order. Thus the essential function of a court
injunction in the United States, which is to involve the contempt power
sanction, does not apply in Japan.
Requiring the Commission to seek court action does have two advan-
tages. First, it gives the respondent an opportunity to defend before a neu-
tral forum. Second, resort to the court for injunctive relief enables the
Commission to trigger adverse public response by publicizing its concern
and that of the court over a particular violation. Thus as one might expect,
its use has been infrequent, limited to major cases with substantial politi-
cal impact-five cases involving the newspaper industry 87 and the
Yawata-Fuji Steel Merger Case. 88 In construing the urgent necessity re-
86. Id. arts. 67, 86. Similar provisions are found in the Shrken torihiki h6 (Securities transac-
tions law) (Law No. 25, 1948) art. 187, and the Shfhin torihikisho h6 (Commodity exchange law)
(Law No. 239, 1950) art. 143.
87. it re K.K. Asahi Shimbunsha, 7 Shinketsushfi 163 (Tokyo High Ct., April 6, 1955); In re
Itrka, 7 Shinketsushii 181 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 23, 1955); In re K.K. Osaka Yomiuri Shimbunsha,
7 Shinketsushii 169 (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 5, 1955); In re K.K. Hokkaid6 Shimbunsha, 8 Shinket-
sushfi 82 (Tokyo High Ct., July 11, 1958); In re K.K. Chlibu Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 22 Shinketsush0i
301 (Tokyo High Ct., April 30, 1975).
88. In re Yawata Seitetsu K.K., petition for temporary injunction to block merger (filed by the
FTC on May 7, 1969, and withdrawn on May 30, 1969).
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quirement, the courts have held that it relates to a situation in which "fair
competition is . . . extremely endangered and it would be impossible to
eliminate the violation following normal procedures." 89
III. ILLEGAL PROCEEDS SURCHARGES
A. German Law
Presumably the result of a compromise in lieu of a higher maximum
fine, the GWB as enacted provided that in the case of willful violations
the fine of 100,000 DM (approximately 4,000 U.S. dollars at prevailing
exchange rates) could be increased by a surcharge equal to three times
any "excess proceeds" (Mehrerlis) realized as a result of the violation. 90
In cases of negligent violations the surcharge was double the amount of
such illegal proceeds to be added to the maximum fine of 30,000 DM.
The provision was patterned after section 6 of the OWiG (since 1968,
section 17[4]).91 The 1973 amendments abolished the distinction between
willful and negligent violations, setting a uniform treble surcharge and
retaining the 100,000 DM maximum fine. 92 GWB section 38(4) was re-
vised further in 1980 to permit the authorities to calculate the amount
realized from illegal conduct on the basis of estimates, and a new provi-
sion-section 37b-was added to provide for a similar treble levy on
gains realized in cases of willful or negligent violations of prohibition
orders against abuses of market power, generally under section 22(5) or
specifically in the case of public utilities under section 103(b). In contrast
to the illegal proceeds surcharge under section 38(4), which is levied in
the context of an administrative fine proceeding subject to the procedural
controls of sections 81 through 85 of the GWB and sections 38 through 47
of the OWiG, the surcharge under section 37b is determined in an ordi-
nary administrative proceeding 93 subject to the more lax procedures of
sections 51 through 80 of the GWB .94
As a penalty the treble surcharge of illegal proceeds of the GWB has
obvious if superficial similarity to treble damages under American anti-
89. lt re Osaka Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 7 Shinketsusha 169 (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 5, 1955).
90. GWB § 38(4); see also Mayer-Wegelin, KOMMENTAR ZUM GsETZ GEGEN WETrBEWERBS-
BESCHRANKUNGEN 662 (H. MUller & P. Giessler eds. 1st ed. 1958).
91. GWB §38(4).
92. Mayer-Wegelin, KOMMENTAR ZUM GESFTZ GEGEN WETBEWERBSBEsCHRANKUNGEN
§ 8. 109 (H. MUller & P. Giessler eds. 3d ed. 1974).
93. F. RITrNER. supra note 42, at 312 (by implication).
94. For detailed explanation of these enforcement procedures, see J. Haley, Antitrust Enforce-
ment: A Comparison of German and Japanese Law (1984) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file
with Washington Law Review).
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trust laws, as several German commentators have observed. 95 Because of
the practical shortcomings of an administratively determined surcharge as
opposed to damage actions, however, they do not share functional simi-
larity as an effective sanction. The problem lies in theproof of the amount
of illegal proceeds in Germany or damages in the United States. To meet
the legal requirements of proof in either case is a difficult and extremely
costly task. 96 This effort in a private damage action is made by private
attorneys where the costs are borne by their clients and the result is a
diffusion of both the required legal manpower and at least the initial
costs. Such diffusion of cost and effort is not possible for an administra-
tive penalty. Instead public enforcement agencies, such as the Federal
Cartel Office, already short of personnel, must assemble all necessary
data-in the case of the Federal Republic, without the scope of discovery
available even in private litigation in the United States. 97 For this reason
the Federal Cartel Office prefers a fixed fine with a high maximum with-
out the attendant problems of proof to the more flexible and potentially
higher surcharge. 98 As Helmut Gutzler remarked to the special commis-
sion to study economic crimes, the Federal Cartel Office would have to
have a computer and enormous data banks for the surcharge provisions to
operate effectively. 99
The delineation of excess proceeds (Mehrerlds) as construed by the
courts is reasonably clear-the difference between revenues actually real-
ized and the amounts that would have been earned had there been no vio-
lation. 100 The courts pointedly note, it is a surcharge on illegal revenues,
not "profits."101 As the appellate court for Berlin (the Kammergericht)
stated in one of the first decisions on the surcharge, 102 it is to be calcu-
lated, in the context of a horizontal restriction of output, by subtracting
the market price from the cartel price.103 Such formulations, however,
gloss over the central issues: how to construct the "market price" and
95. F. RrrTNER, supra note 42, at 312. See also Werner, Rechtsfolgen bei Wettbewerbsverstflen
im GWB, 1977178, SCHWERPUNKTE DES KARTELLRECHTS 54.
96. The cost of both prosecuting and defending antitrust damage actions in the United States is
well known. See, e.g., K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, supra note 74, at 71.
97. On the scope of discQvery under German and Japanese law, see Harada, Civil Discovery
under Japanese Law, 16 LAW IN JAPAN 21 (1983).
98. Gutzler, 10 COMMISSION HEARINGS, supra note 16, app. 4, at 36.
99. Gutzler, 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 7, at 36.
100. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 28, 1972 (Linoleum), Kammergericht (appellate court), Ber-
lin, W. Ger., WIRTSCHAFr UIND WETrBEWERB/ENTCHEIDUNGSSAMLUNG OBERLANDESGERICHT [WuW/
E OLG] 1349, 1350; Judgment of Nov. 7, 1980 (Programmnzeitschriften), Kammergericht, Berlin,
W. Ger., WuW/E OLG 2369, 2375.
101. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1972 (Linoleum), Kammergericht, Berlin, W. Ger., WuWE OLG
1349, 1350.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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how to prove how much was actually realized as a result of the violation.
In this area any hopes for the kind of certainty customarily (if not consti-
tutionally) required 104 under German law in the case of administrative and
criminal fines become illusory. One consequence is the permissive lan-
guage added in 1980 to permit calculations based on estimates.105 There
remains, however, unlike in Japan as discussed below, no fixed, legally
required method for such calculation. 106 Methods that have been used in-
clude price comparisons immediately before and during the effective term
of a cartel 107 and examination of the price levels of the same or similar
products in comparable markets in an attempt to establish a hypothetical
market price. 108 No method is considered entirely satisfactory. 109
Finally, as a consequence of the problems associated with the illegal
proceeds surcharge, the Federal Cartel Office has made use of the excess
proceeds surcharge provision of GWB section 38(4) in relatively few in-
stances. Between 1968 and 1977, out of 171 administrative fine proceed-
ings, only twenty-six involved the surcharge. 110 The amounts collected,
however, have not been negligible. The surcharge reaped over 110 mil-
lion DM (44 million U.S. dollars). "'It appears to be the most effective
formal penalty under German antitrust law.
B. Japanese Law
In Japan, as in Germany, the surcharge has proved to be the most effec-
tive antitrust sanction. The most significant addition to the Japanese Anti-
monopoly and Fair Trade Law under the 1977 amendments was article 7-
2, which enables the FTC to levy a similar surcharge (kach(5kin) on the
104. This point has been raised in Erlinghagen & Zippel, Der "MehrerlOs" als Grundlage der
BufJgeldfestsetzung bei Kartellverstflen, 1974 DER BETRIEB [DB] 953, 954. But see E. GOHLER.
GESETZ UBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN § 17, 4E, at 11I (4th ed. 1975) (dismissing such questions in
the context of the similar provision of the OWiG).
105. There is a fair volume of literature on the subject of methods of calculating the excess
proceeds surcharge. The most often cited is Albuschkat, Zur Problematik der Bestimmung des
Mehrerhses bei Kartellverstfien, 1976 WETrBEWERB IN RECHT UiND PRAXIs 666. See also H. AL-
BACH. ALS-OB-KONzEP" UIND ZEITLICHER VERGLEICHSMARKT (1976); A.H. von Oertzen, Methoden-
probleme bei der Bestimmung des Mehrerlos nach § 38 Abs. 4 des Gesetzes gegen Wettbenverbs-
beschrankungen (doctoral dissertation, Bonn University, 1974); Erlinghagen & Zippel, supra note
104; Gutzler, 10 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 4, at 32.
106. Albuschkat identifies three separate methods. Albuschkat, supra note 105, at 667.
107. See Judgment of Nov. 28, 1972 (Linoleum), Kammergericht, Berlin, W. Ger., WuW/E
OLG 1349.
108. See Judgment of Nov. 7, 1980 (Programmzeitschriften), Kammergericht, Berlin, W. Ger.,
WuW/E OLG 2369, 2375.
109. Gutzler, 10 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 4, at 34-35.
110. BUNDESKARTELLAMT [BKARTA], 1978 T.TIGKEITBERICHT 45.
111. Id.
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proceeds from an illegal restraint of trade. Until 1977 the statute con-
tained no sanction against illegal cartels other than criminal penalties, mi-
nor administrative fines and damage actions, all of which were allowed to
atrophy at least before the Oil Cartel cases. As a result, there has been
little incentive to comply with the statute until the FTC brought an en-
forcement action. Even then, in many instances illegal activity could con-
tinue with relative impunity.
The Japanese surcharge, like the German counterpart on which it was
modelled, is essentially a means to recover the economic gains from ille-
gal cartels. It is levied against entrepreneurs or, under article 8-3, trade
associations and their members, for price-fixing or output restrictions that
increase the price for goods or services in violation of the prohibitions of
article 3 and 8(1) against unreasonable restraints of trade, and of article 6
against conclusion of international agreements containing unreasonable
restraints of trade. 112
Unlike German law, the statute supplemented by the cabinet order for
its enforcement detail the method of computing the surcharge. The for-
mula is complex. In articles 7-2(1) the statute provides that it is to be an
amount equal to-
one-half of the amount arrived at by multiplying the turnover of such goods
and services, computed in accordance with the method prescribed by cabi-
net order, for the period from the date on which the entrepreneur engaged in
the business practice to the date on which the entrepreneur discontinued
such practice (hereinafter referred to as "period of such practice") by three
percent (by four percent for the manufacturing industry, by two percent for
the retail businesses or by one percent for wholesale businesses); provided
that in cases where the amount thus computed is below two hundred thou-
sand yen, the Commission may not order payment of such surcharge.
The supplementary cabinet order sets out the method for calculating
"turnovers" as the total price of goods delivered or services supplied for
the period of the cartel agreement. 113 The result is a fixed if complex for-
mula that gives Japanese law at least an appearance of certainty and fair-
ness.
The 1977 amendments also provided in a new article 48-2 for a sepa-
rate administrative proceeding to levy the surcharge. Consequently, like
the Germans the Japanese now have a bifurcated set of enforcement pro-
cedures-one to determine the fact of a violation and to order remedial
measures, with another to levy the excess proceeds surcharge. Unlike the
112. The best general commentary on the illegal proceeds surcharge in Japanese law is found in 1
A. SH6DA. supra note 6, at 548. See also Motonaga, Kachikin seid no genj6 to dk5 (Current status
and trends of the illegal proceeds surcharge system), 751 JuRistrro 43 (1981).
113. Seirei (Cabinet Order No. 317, 1977) arts. 4 & 5.
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German administrative fine proceedings, however, the Japanese sur-
charge procedures are reasonably efficient and at least procedurally pro-
tective. Article 48-2 enables the FTC to calculate the surcharge and then
to notify the respondent of the amount, the basis for its calculation, and
the illegal activity on which it is based. 114 The notice also includes the
deadline for payment. The respondent does have the right to present its
case and to submit evidence to prior notice of an FTC decision to issue a
surcharge order.' 15 Only after the order is issued, however, does the re-
spondent have a right to a hearing.l16 The procedures for such a hearing
are the same as those for adjudication of a contested decision on the viola-
tion and remedial measures. 17
A final procedural issue of interest is the language of article 7-2 appar-
ently requiring the FTC to levy the surcharge whenever there has been an
illegal price cartel or output cartel affecting price. The mandatory lan-
guage of the statute is exceptional for any Japanese regulatory penalty and
appears to remove any discretion on the part of the FTC over whether to
initiate a surcharge proceeding. " 18 In practice it appears that the FTC has
complied. The surcharge has been levied in all relevant cartel cases. Of
the ten cases involving violation of article 3 or article 8(/)(i) decided in
1979, final surcharge orders were issued in all but three by the end of
March 1981.119 A surcharge proceeding is premised, however, on an
FTC finding of a relevant violation 20 with a statute of limitations provi-
sion of three years after the violation ceased (or within one year after a
formal decision). 121 One of the most difficult issues in a surcharge pro-
ceeding is to determine the duration of the violation. 122 Presumably, the
party can contest the fact of the violation in the context of a hearing on the
surcharge. The proviso to article 48-2 requires that where formal hearings
on the violation have begun, no surcharge order be issued until after the
proceedings are completed-i.e., a final decision is entered. 123
114. Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law art. 48-2(1).
115. Id. art. 48-2(4).
116. Id. art. 48-2(5).
117. 1 A. SH6DA. supra note 6, at 563. The FTC order in the case In re Reng6 K.K., -
Shinketsushf6 - (FTC Order of February 2, 1984) was the first surcharge order issued after full
adjudicatory hearings. For discussion of this case, see Sawada, Kachdkin no ndfu o meizuru no
saish5 no shinketsu (First decision ordering payment of surcharge) 402 K6SETORItKI 38 (1984).
118. 1 A. SH6ODA. supra note 6, at 550.
119. Id. at558.
120. Id. at 563.
121. Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law art. 7-2(5); 1 A. SHODA. supra note 6, at 557.
122. See 1 A. SHODA. supra note 6, at 563; H. IYOR & A. UESuG. supra note 4, at 55. See also 2
A. SHODA. DOKUSEN KINSHI HO KENKYU (Antimonopoly law studies) 110 (1976) (anticipating the
problem under the Diet bill).
123. 1 A. SHODA. supra note 6, at 563.
Vol. 59:471, 1984
Antitrust Sanctions in Germany and Japan
The need to include detailed provisions for collection of the surcharge
exemplifies the fundamental weakness of civil enforcement in Japan,
even when an administrative agency is involved. Article 64-2 provides
first that if the respondent fails to pay by the designated deadline, it is to
be sent a reminder (paragraph 1) and the Commission may collect an ad-
ditional charge of 14.5 percent per annum (paragraph 2). Upon continued
failure to pay, the Commission can avail itself of the collection powers of
the National Tax Collection Law124 (paragraph 4) and acquire a lien on
the respondent's property superior to all claims except for national and
local taxes (paragraph 5).
As in the case of the illegal proceeds levy under the GWB, the Japa-
nese surcharge has already generated a significant amount in fines. Be-
tween 1977 and March 1983 there were a total of thirty-two cases involv-
ing 662 respondents for a total of nearly 15 billion yen (60 million
dollars). 125 For a statute in which only a few years previously the highest
possible fine was $2000, the added enforcement value of the surcharge
needs no further explanation.
IV. DAMAGE ACTIONS AND OTHER PRIVATE LAW
SANCTIONS
A. German law
Three kinds of civil sanctions for antitrust violations are possible under
the GWB. 126 Section 35 provides, first, for a private damage action, al-
though without the trebled penalty of American law. Second, the section
also permits private suits for injunctive relief. Finally, the invalidity or
124. Kokuzei chfshfi h6 (Law No. 147, 1959).
125. Motonaga, Showa 56 nendo shimoki ni okeru Kachikin nefu meirei no gaiy6 (Summary of
surcharge payment orders through the latter period of 1981), 378 KOSEI TORIHM 22, 23 (1982); KOSEI
TORIHIKI I'NKAI NENJI HOKOKU SHrWA 58 (1983 Fair Trade Commission annual report) 21 (1984).
126. The notion that private actions under the GWB operate as a sanction is not questioned in
German literature. L. LINDER. PRIVATKLAGE UND SCHADENSERZATZ IM KARTELLRECHT: EINE VER-
GLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN REcHT 24 (1980). There is also a
vast literature on the use of civil remedies in German antitrust enforcement. Much of it tends to
emphasize refined, if not rarified, issues of theory that go beyond the scope of this study and do not
require elaboration here. But they do provide important insights. The most influential include: K.
MAILANDER. PRIVATRECHLICHE FOLGEN UNDERLAUBTER KARTELLPRAXIS (1964); H. MOLLER-LAUBE,
DER PRIVATE RECHTSCHUTZ GEGEN UNZULASSIGE BESCHRANKUNGEN DES WETrBEWERBS UND MISS-
BRAUCHLICHE AusOBUNG VON MARKTMACHT IM DEUTSCHEN KARTELLRECHT (1980); K. SCHMIDT, KAR-
TELLVERFAHRENSRECHT-KARTELLVERWALTUNGSRECHT-BURGERLICHES RECHT (1977); Mertens, De-
liktsrecht und Sonderprivatrecht-Zur Rechtsfortbildung des deliktischen Schutzes Von
Vermn6gensinteressen, 178 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVLUSTIsCHE PRAXIs [AcP] 227 (1978); Mestmgcker, Das
Verhufltnis des Rechts der Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen zum Privatrecht, 1968 DB 787; Mestmacker,
Ober das Verhdltnis des Rechis der Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen zum Privatrecht, 168 AcP 235
(1968).
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nullity of contracts in violation of the GWB can be asserted both as a
defense to a contract action as well as in a suit for a declaratory judg-
ment. 127 Nonetheless, civil sanctions are rarely used. Complete figures on
the total number of all private suits brought under the GWB are appar-
ently not available. Few cases are reported. The principal compilation of
German antitrust decisions, by the periodical Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb
(WuW), includes only seventy-four private actions alleging violations of
the GWB between 1958 and 1978.128 Of these only thirty-two were
brought under article 35, nineteen for injunctive relief, only eleven for
damages. This compares to at least twenty-two private actions in which
the validity of a contract was the principal issue. In six of these the issue
was raised as a defense. The remedy sought in other cases was not re-
ported. Presumably most also involved the validity of a contract or agree-
ment. Whether or not the few cases reported reflect accurately a general
dearth of civil actions, few if any observers consider private actions to
provide at present a meaningful mechanism for antitrust enforcement. 129
Procedural or "process" barriers are not the major cause of the paucity
of civil actions. Unlike Japan, access to the courts is not a problem in the
Federal Republic. With one judge for every two lawyers, the disposition
of both trials and appeals is remarkably swift. Of the first instance civil
actions under the GWB reported in Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, seven-
teen cases were decided less than two years but more than one year after
the alleged violation occurred. In twenty-three the interval from the date
of the violation to a decision was less than a year but more than six
months. At least eight cases were tried within six months. No case took
longer than four years from the date of the violation to try and several
were decided within one month. 130 Lack of discovery and the consequent
difficulty in proving damages (as well as the violation) is a substantial
hurdle,'13 but it is difficult to say that this is any more serious than the
costs to American litigants in prosecuting or defending an antitrust ac-
127. None of the limitations on declaratory judgments found in American law apply to Germany.
In practice, a judicial declaration (Feststellung) of legal relationships is one of the most common sort
ofjudicial "relief" sought.
128. Based on author's review of the complete collection of cases in WIRTSCHAFT UND WEmr.
BEWERBIENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMLUNG LANDGERICHTE/AMTGERICHTE [WuW/E LG/AG] 109-457. Not in-
cluded are cases in which a violation of the GWB was a subsidiary issue, particularly to alleged
violations of European community antitrust regulation under art. 85 of the Treaty of Rome.
129. See, e.g., Steindorff, supra note 43, app. 6, at 5-10. See also L. LINDER. supra note 126:
K. SCHMiDT. AUFGABEN UND LEISTUNGEN DER GESETZGEBUNG IM KARTELLRECHT; EINE RECHTSPOLI-
TISCHE STUDIE ZU DEN AUSSERSTRAFRECHTLICHEN SANKTIONEN IM GWB (1978).
130. The date of the violation is unclear in many cases, but in only eight cases could it possibly
have been longer than three years from the date of the decision.
131. See, e.g., Steindorff, supra note 43, app. 6, at 8.
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tion, 132 or the difficulties imposed by American rules of evidence, with
which, lacking jury trials, the Germans are fortunate not to have to
cope. 133 Unlike American and Japanese litigation (but like the United
Kingdom and most other common law jurisdictions), however, the unsuc-
cessful plaintiff as well as defendant becomes liable for all costs incurred
by both sides, including attorneys' fees. 134 Nor is the contingent fee per-
missible. Consequently, there is little incentive for the prospective plain-
tiffs to pursue a case they have any likelihood of losing and they must be
able to finance the litigation from the start. The relative lack of success of
most plaintiffs makes this a risky venture. Of the first instance cases sur-
veyed less than half were successful. Moreover, when awarded, the
amount of damages tends to be quite small. 135
The factor that seems best to explain the relative ineffectiveness of
damage suits and injunctive relief as a sanction is their restriction to a
limited class of violations. Section 35 is construed within the context of
section 823(2) of the Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, or BGB).136
Under this provision a claim for compensation for injury caused by viola-
tion of a statute depends upon whether the injured interests were intended
to be violated. 37 Each statute or statutory provision is thus subject to
classification as a "protective statute" (Schutzgesetz) or "protective pro-
vision" (Schutzvorschrift) with the party or interest as the "protected ob-
ject" (Schutzobjekt).138 Such classification requires a determination of
legislative intent: whether the statute or provision "serves for the protec-
tion of the general public interest alone or is designed wholly or in part,
for the protection of an individual interest from violation of the prescribed
norm." 1 39 In the case of the GWB the legislative intent was until recently
thought to be clear. Most commentators agreed that only those provisions
with an express prohibition (Verbot) or mandate (Gebot) had the "protec-
tive" purpose necessary for a damage action or injunctive relief under
132. On the costs of antitrust litigation in the United States, see supra note 96.
133. See, e.g., Baur, supra note 23, at 54, 55. On the comparative problems of evidence, see L.
LINDER. supra note 126, at 134.
134. Baur, supra note 23, at 58, 59. For a German reaction to the cost of U.S. antitrust litigation,
see Steindorff, supra note 43, app. 6, at 10.
135. See, e.g., F. RrrrNER.supra note 42, at 310.
136. BGB § 823 provides:
(1) A person who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom,
property or other right of another is bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom.
(2) The same obligation is placed upon a person who infringes a statute intended for the pro-
tection of others, If, according to the provisions of the statute, an infringement of this is possible
even without fault, the duty to make compensation arises only in the event of fault.
137. See, e.g., Mertens, 3/2 MONCHENER KOMMENTARZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 823,
140, at 1183 (P. Ulmer ed. 2d ed. 1980).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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section 35.140 Subject to similar analysis are violations of administrative
and court orders. Orders expressly prohibiting or mandating certain con-
duct give rise to both damage actions and injunctive relief under section
35 by those within the intended scope of protection. 141
This construction limits private suits under section 35 to violations of
sections 14, 25, and 26.142 Under the view that an express prohibition or
mandate is required for civil sanctions to apply, violations of provisions
or administrative declarations phrased in terms of the invalidity or nullity
of agreements are not subject to either private damage actions or injunc-
tive relief. Consequently, no private action under section 35 could be
brought against violations of sections 1 or 15, the principal provisions
against horizontal and vertical restraints and abuses of market power
under section 22. Until 1975 both the principal commentaries 43 and
cases 1 " gave support to this view. There was, however, dissent, particu-
larly with respect to section 1. 145
Not only does such view exclude the most important violations from
the reach of private law sanctions under section 35, it also creates the
anomaly that certain conduct, such as "concerted practices" under sec-
140. See Benisch. MULLER-HENNEBERG. supra note 14, at § 35, 3; H. KAUFMANN & H.G.
RAUTMANN. KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN WETrBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN § 35, 3, n. 11 (4th ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTER KoMMENt, rAR]; E. LANGEN. E. NIEDERTHINGER & U.
SCHMIDT. KOMMENTAR ZUM KARTELLGESETZ 618 (5th ed. 1977); H. MULLER & P. GESSLER. supra
note 7. § 35, 13. See also L. LINDER. supra note 126, at 30. The first reported decisions on § I of
the GWB were at odds with all the commentaries. These decisions held that an injunction or compen-
sation under § 35 could be awarded for violations of § I since the section could be considered a
"protective provision" when read in connection with § 38(l). Judgment of Sept. 8, 1959 (Filmtran-
sport), Diisseldorf Dist. Ct., W. Ger., WuW/E LG/AG 146; Judgment of Dec. 18, 1964 (Zweittaxi),
Mannheim Dist. Ct., W. Ger., WuW/E LG/AG 259.
141. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER KOMMENTAR. supra note 140, § 35, 12. The 1980 amendments
added a new paragraph 2 that makes it clear that violations of administrative and court orders are
subject to damage actions and private injunctive relief. This was not in doubt, however. The purpose
of the revision was to permit recovery or damages from the time the order was served rather than from
the time when all appeals were completed. RIEsENKAMPFF (1981), supra note 3, at 73. See also Judg-
ment of June 8, 1977 (Objektschutz), Kalsruhe High Ct., W. Ger., WuW/E OLG 1952.
142. Benisch, MULLER-HENNEBERG, supra note 14, § 35, 3. Benisch also lists violations of
GWB §§ 38(1)9 and 38(2) prior to the 1973 amendment of § 38, and the duty to respond truthfully to
disclosure demands and investigation under § 46 and 47, citing Spengler, Zivilrechtliche Auswir-
kungen des Kartellgesetzes. 1960 WUW 428.
143. See Benisch, MULLER-HENNEBERG. supra note 14, at 869 (2d ed. 1963); FRANKFURTER
KOMMENTAR. supra note 140, at § 35, 13-1I; B5 H. MULLER & P. GIESSLER. supra note 7, 13.
144. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 8, 1958, Federal Sup. Ct., W. Ger., (4711), 1958 WUW/E
BGH 753 (§ 15 not a "protective provision"); Judgment of Oct. 22, 1973 (Strombezugspreis), Fed-
eral Sup. Ct., W. Ger., 1973 WUW/E BGH 1299 (§ 22 not a "protective provision"); Judgment of
Jan. 12, 1976 (Weirfschaum). Kammergericht, Berlin, W. Ger., 1976 WuW/E OLG 1637 (§ 24 not a
"protective provision").
145. See discussion and works cited in Spengler, Zivilrechtliche Auswirkungen des Kartell-
gesetz, 1960 WuW 419. See also Spengler, Uber die Tatbestandsmiifligkeit und Rechtswidrigkeit von
Wettbewerbsbeschr/inkungen, 1960 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETIBEWERB-SCHRFTENREIHE 29.
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tion 25(1), are subject to private damage suits and injunctions only if not
subject to formal agreement. Once formalized in a contract, such conduct
would violate section 1 as a horizontal restraint or section 15 as a vertical
restraint and thus be excluded from the scope of section 35. Doubts as to
whether this result accurately reflects the legislative intent are increased
by the fact that section 25(1) was added to the GWB in 1973 in response
to the Federal Supreme Court decision in the Teerfarben case 146 to ensure
that the lack of proof of a formal contractual undertaking would not lead
to easy evasion of section 1.147 Such anomalies are inexorable, however,
given the awkward scheme followed in the GWB, on the one hand simply
invalidating agreements and contractual arrangements but making the
performance of such involved agreements subject to an administrative
fine, while prohibiting noncontractual conduct outright on the other hand.
Other than possible concern over abstract notions of freedom of contract
and party autonomy, there seems little reason to penalize the former less
severely. Moreover, the evidence of any real legislative intent to do so is
sparse at best.
The Federal Supreme Court threw open the issue of whether a damage
action can be brought against formalized horizontal and vertical restraints
in its decision of April 4, 1975, in the Krankenhauszusatzversicherung
case. 148 The case involved a suit by several private health insurance firms
against two public hospital insurance plans (with some ten million mem-
bers) and four private insurers who had agreed to a common special insur-
ance program for cases of higher risk, to the disadvantage of competitors
who were not included. The plaintiffs alleged violations of section 1 of
the Law Against Unfair Competition 149 as well as sections 1 and 26(2) of
the GWB. The court decided the case solely on the grounds of section 1
of the GWB, holding that at least competitors came within the protected
scope of section 1 and could thus obtain injunctive relief or damages
under section 35. The case caused considerable controversy and attempts
to limit its application. 150 It is generally interpreted to limit the protective
146. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1970, Federal Sup. Ct., W. Ger., 24 BGHSt 54, 1970 WuW/E BGH
1147 (holding that the GWB did not proscribe tacit assent or concerted action in restraint of trade).
147. F. RITrNER. supra note 42, at 219.
148. 64 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 232, 1975 WuW/E
BGH 1361, affg Judgment of Apr. 9, 1974, Drisseldorf High Ct., W. Ger., 1974 WuW/E OLG
1523, affg Judgment of Feb. 20, 1973, Cologne Dist. Ct., W. Ger., 1973 WuW/E LG/AG 348.
149. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG], Law of June 7, 1909, REICHS-
GESETZBLATr [RGBI] 499 (W. Ger.).
150. For comment on the case, see L. LINDER. supra note 126, at 26; and Steindorff, 31 JURIS-
TENzErrNG [JZ] 29-31 (1976). For one of the strongest critiques, see Benisch, Private Verfolgung
von Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen undAligemeininteresse, in WET'BEWERBSORDNUNG IM SPANNUNGS-
FELD VON WIRTSCHAFrs- UND REcHTswISSENSCHAFr: FESTSCHRIFr FOR GUNTHER HARTMANN 38 (1976).
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reach of section 1 to competitors, 151 or possibly a contract party 52 who
can show injury as a result of an agreement proscribed under section 1.
Suppliers or direct buyers, much less the ultimate consumers who suffer
from the effects of an illegal cartel, are still not considered within the
protected category. 153 Ultimately, however, as Professor Fritz Rittner
notes, 154 it is left to judges to decide what interests are protected and the
Krankenhauszusatzversicherung case leaves them with a somewhat
greater margin for a flexible response to the issue. Nonetheless, the deci-
sion has not altogether removed the barriers to more effective resort to
article 35 as a sanction.
A second potential limitation on the efficacy of damage actions is the
necessity of proving fault (negligence or intentional conduct) on the part
of the defendant. Proof of fault along with that of injury and causality are
requirements in damage actions but not (except in terms of standing) for
injunctive relief. 155 Yet, from the cases surveyed there does not appear to
be any significant difference between resort to injunctions and damage
claims.
At least brief mention should be made of the third type of civil sanc-
tion. Agreements that violate GWB sections 1 and 15 are made either
invalid or void by the express language of the statute. Moreover, as noted
previously, the enforcement authorities have express authority to issue
declarations of the invalidity or nullity of offending agreements. Such
agreements plus those expressly prohibited are therefore subject to either
judicial declaration or the defense to a contract enforcement action that
they are invalid or void under generally applicable provisions of German
civil law-that is, sections 134 and 139 of the BGB. 156 Exercised infre-
quently and only in unusual circumstances, this remedy cannot be consid-
ered generally effective or meaningful as a sanction. From the lower court
decisions reviewed by the author, it appears that few parties to cartel
agreements bring contract actions to invalidate agreements under section
1. Similarly, the remedy is seldom used in cases subject to section 15.
In conclusion, without the incentive of treble or even, as proposed by
Professor Steindorff, 157 double damages, which are not available under
15 1. See Judgment of May 25, 1977 (Zeitschriftenvertrieb), Karlsruhe High Ct., W. Ger., 1977
WuW/E OLG 1855.
152. Judgment of Feb. 15, 1963 (Brfickenbauwerk), Celle High Ct., W. Ger., 1963 WuW/E
OLG 559,561.
153. Goll. Verbraucherschutz in Kartellrecht, 1976 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHurZ UND URHE-
BERRECHT [GRUR] 456,491.
154. F. RITrNER, supra note 42, at 308.
155. Id.at310.
156. Mayer-Maly, I MUNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH. § 134, 66 (F.
S~ickered. Isted. 1978).
157. Steindorff. 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 6, at 7.
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the German system, civil sanctions under the GWB are not likely to pro-
vide a significant deterrent to antitrust violations.
B. Japanese Law
In no area is the contrast between German and Japanese experience in
antitrust enforcement greater than with respect to private enforcement ac-
tions. Although Japanese law is considerably more permissive of damage
actions, with the important exception that actions brought under the Japa-
nese statute as opposed to tort actions under the Civil Code require an
FTC decision as a prerequisite, there apparently have been only a half
dozen damage suits in Japan. Of the reported cases, two were settled by
compromise 158 and another for lack of the requisite FTC decision.159 The
others were dismissed for failure to prove damages. 160
The Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law sets out the basis for a claim for
damages in article 25:
1. Any entrepreneur who has effected private monopolization or an un-
reasonable restraint of trade or who has employed an unfair business prac-
tice is liable for compensation to persons injured thereby.
2. No entrepreneur may be exempted from the liability prescribed in the
preceding paragraph by proving the non-existence of willfulness or negli-
gence on its part.
Because of the second paragraph, article 25 is construed simply to pro-
vide for strict liability for damages caused by a violation. 161 Ordinary but
high standards for proof of damages and causation must be met by the
plaintiff. 162 Damage actions under section 25 are also limited to viola-
tions by entrepeneurs, which as defined in article 2(1)163 excludes trade
associations. 164
158. The first case settled by compromise was K.K. Kosaka Seikyoku v. Taish6 Seiyaku K.K., 9
Shinketsushgi 162 (1957) (reported even though settled by compromise). The second case arose out of
the oil cartel cases. See Miyasaka, Sh6hisha ni yoru t6yu karuteru ni tsuite no songai baish6 seikya
sosho (Consumer litigation for compensation for damages resulting from the kerosene cartel), 768
JURIstrro 252, 255 (1982). See also Ramseyer, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement after the Oil Em-
bargo, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 395,418 (1983).
159. Kot6 v. Kansai SurippaSeiz6 Kaisha, 2 KIZAIH6 60 (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 24, 1958).
160. See Shfda, Dokusen kinshi h6 ihan k6i to songai baishd (Antimonopoly violations and
compensatory damages), 25 KEIZAI H6GAKU NENPO 1 (1982), translated in 16 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (1983).
See also Ramseyer, supra note 159.
161. 2 A. SH6DA. supra note 6, at 355.
162. Id. at 357.
163. Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law art. 2(1) provides: "The term 'entrepreneur' as used in
this Law means a person who carries on a commercial, industrial, financial or any other business."
164. Sh6da, supra note 160, at 2 (16 LAW IN JAPAN at 3).
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Article 26 also restricts the application of the statutory damage action
to instances in which the FTC has entered a final recommendation, con-
sent, or contested decision, or a final surcharge order under article 54-
2(1). Consequently, no damage action can be maintained under the stat-
ute without prior formal action by the FTC. Nonetheless, the view that an
ordinary tort action under article 709 of the Civil Code can be brought
without a final FTC decision, thus permitting damage actions against
trade associations, has long been widely held among Japanese antitrust
and civil law scholars. 165 In 1981 the first judicial decision so holding was
handed down in a tort action against the Sekiyu Renmei, the petroleum
industry association, and individual petroleum firms for price-fixing in
1973.166 Proof of negligence or willful conduct is required in tort action,
as opposed to strict liability under the statute. 167
The findings in Commission decisions do not bind the courts in a dam-
age action under article 25. This accords with the effect given to final
court judgments since, at least at present, collateral estoppel is not recog-
nized in Japanese law. 168 However, the FTC's findings do constitute
prima facie evidence of the violation. 169
The difficulties faced by plaintiffs in proving damages seem to explain
best why so few damage actions are brought. The first significant damage
action was the 1977 case of Okawa v. Matsushita Denki Sangy6 K.K., 170
which arose out of a 1971 consent decision against Matsushita Electric
Industrial Company for resale price maintenance. The case involved two
principal legal issues: whether consumers had standing to bring a damage
action under articles 25 and 26 of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Law,
and the scope of review of the FTC's findings. The Tokyo High Court
held first that consumers do have standing. Thus a broader spectrum of
damage actions are possible in Japan than in Germany, at least at present,
although the reverse seems to be the case, as noted, for direct appeals
from administrative actions. On the second issue the court refused to ap-
ply the substantial evidence rule to damage actions. The consent decision
was held to provide prima facie evidence of the violation but not to bind
the court. Nonetheless the court affirmed the findings that there had been
a violation. Ultimately, however, the plaintiffs lost. They failed to meet
the requirements for proof of the amount of damage sustained as a result
165. See S. IMAMURA. DOKUSEN KINSHI HO (Antimonopoly law) (52 HORITSUGAKU ZENSHO) 84
(rev. ed. 1967).
166. Sat6 v. Sekiyu Renmei, 997 HANREIJIno 18 (Yamagata Ct., Mar. 31, 1981).
167. 2 SHODA. supra note 6, at 357.
168. See T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 7.0618][b] (1983).
169. Okawa v. Matsushita Denki Sangy6 K.K., 863 HANREI JIO 20 (Tokyo High Ct.. Sept. 19,
1977). summarized in English in 10 LAW IN JAPAN 165 (1977).
170. Id.
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of the violation. They could not show what the retail price of color televi-
sion receivers would have been had the defendant not engaged in illegal
resale price maintenance.
Because of the failure to prove damages, the courts have dismissed the
three damage actions brought in the wake of the Oil Cartel cases. 171 The
first two were brought in the Tokyo High Court under articles 25 and 26.
One of these was settled, 172 but the plaintiffs lost the other in a 1981 deci-
sion. 173 The plaintiffs won on the principal legal issue as to whether legit-
imate administrative guidance by MITI was a defense, but the high court
dismissed the action for failure to prove damages. 174
Additional institutional barriers to litigation, such as delay and costs,
the lack of the treble damage incentive, and a possible reluctance on the
part of business firms to sue as a result of complex and close interrelation-
ships even with their competitors also work to preclude effective use of
the damage action as either remedy or penalty in antitrust enforcement.
With only about 2,700 judges and 11,000 trial lawyers in Japan 175 as
compared to over 17,000 judges and 35,000 lawyers in the Federal Re-
public, 176 litigation is a far slower and much more costly affair in Japan.
The least delayed of the six antitrust damage actions was the Yamagata
District Court tort action, which took over seven years from the time of
both the violation and filing. With appeals it would have taken at least
two years longer. Because the remaining cases were brought under arti-
cles 25 and 26 and thus were based on an FTC decision, they took even
longer from the date of the violation.
As to the private law consequences of antitrust violations, it should be
noted first that contracts and other juristic acts (horitsu k5i) that violate
public law are not necessarily invalid under Japanese law. As articulated
by the Supreme Court, upholding contracts entered without prior ap-
proval in violation of the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Con-
trol Law, 177 the test is whether the proscription involved is merely regula-
tory (torishimari h6ki) or mandatory (ky5k3 h5ki). 178 Whether or not an
171. See Kaneko, Sekiyu yami karuteru songai baishO sekiyu jiken TOkyb k6sai hanketsu o me-
gutte (Concerning the Tokyo high court decision in the secret oil cartel damage action), 377 KOSEI
TORIHIKI 26 (1981).
172. See supra note 158.
173. Kai v. Nihon Sekiyu K.K., 1005 HANREI JIH6 (No. 1005) 32 (Tokyo High Ct., July 17,
1981).
174. 36 Minshfg 265 (Sup. Ct., March 9, 1982).
175. D. HENDERSON & J. HALEY. supra note 77, at 438.
176. STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 1981 FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 323.
177. Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku b6eki kanri h6 (Law No. 228, 1949).
178. Tomita v. Inoue, 435 HANREI JIH6 38 (Sup. Ct., Ist P.B., Dec. 23, 1965), translated in D.
HENDERSON & J. HALEY. supra note 77, at 423; Ryfikyii Gink6 K.K. v. T6kai Denki K6ji K.K., 782
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antitrust violation renders contracts or other juristic acts invalid, and if so,
to what extent the act is void or only voidable, has long been an issue of
some dispute. 179
The recent Supreme Court decision in K.K. Miyagawa v. Gifu Sh6k5
Shiny6 Kumiai' 80 provides a partial answer. The case declared invalid a
condition in a loan agreement that the borrower maintain a low-interest
deposit equal to the borrowed amount as security. The court held that this
violated article 19 as an unfair business practice under item 10 of the
FTC's 1953 General Designation of Unfair Business Practices, 181 pros-
cribing taking unfair advantage of a superior bargaining position. On the
issue of the validity of the contract provision, the Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Nagoya High Court. The Supreme Court held 82 that the provi-
sion was not invalid as either a violation of the Antimonopoly and Fair
Trade Law or under the public policy provision of the Civil Code (article
90), but rather held it to be unenforceable to the extent it violated the
Interest Rate Restriction Law. 183 Unfair business practices in violation of
article 19 are not per se invalid, the Court stated. 184 Since only the FTC is
authorized to take remedial measures, not the courts, the Court contin-
ued, it would be improper for the courts to invalidate contracts and other
juristic acts for antitrust violations. 185 The opinion did not foreclose com-
pletely the possibility, however, that the gravity of the violation and the
consequences of invalidating a contract could dictate a different result in
different circumstances. The Court thus opted for an idea first suggested
by Professor Ienobu Fukumitsu that the nature of the antitrust offense and
consequences of invalidating the contract should be weighed. 186 The net
result is that the law in this area remains vague and uncertain and does not
promote preventive self-enforcement.
HANREI JIHO 19 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., July 15, 1975), summarized in English in 9 LAw IN JAPAN 158
(1976).
179. See, e.g.. S. IMAMURA. supra note 165, at 172; 1 SHODA. supra note 6, at 500.
180. 31 Minshi 449 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B.,June 20, 1977).
181. Fair Trade Commission Notification No. 11, 1953, translated in H. IYORI & A. UESUGI.
supra note 4, at 265. The 1953 General Designation was superseded in 1982 by the Amended Desig-
nations in Fair Trade Comm'n Notification No. 15, 1982, translated in H. IYORI & A. UESUGI. supra
note 4, at 266.
182. Mivagawa, 31 Minshfi at 459.
183. Risoku seigen h6 (Law No. 100, 1954).
184. Mivagawa, 31 Minshii at 459.
185. For comment on this point, see I A. SH6DA. supra note 6, at 501.
186. Fukumitsu, Dokusen kinshi h6 ihan k~i no kdryoku (The validity of acts in violation of the
Antimonopoly Law) (pts. I & 2), 82 KOKUMIN KEIZAI ZASSHI 25 (Dec. 1950); 83 KOKUMIN KEIZAI
ZASSHI 14 (Mar. 1951).
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V. CONCLUSION: ADVERSE PUBLICITY
If the formal sanctions of both German and Japanese antitrust law have
failed to provide fully effective deterrents to antitrust violations, at least
until very recently, it does not necessarily follow that there has been no
deterrent or that antitrust enforcement has been a failure in both countries.
Although impressionistic conclusions are probably correct that business-
men in both countries have been less sensitive to the antitrust conse-
quences of their conduct than their counterparts in the United States, 187
their awareness of the consequences and concern to avoid prohibited con-
duct has increased, at least in Japan, along with the increase in the num-
ber of enforcement actions. 188 As a theoretical proposition the argument
may be sound that fines that do not cover the actual profits gained from a
violation do not provide an effective sanction. 189 Reality is more com-
plex. There is at least one additional element to add to the calculus: the
effect of adverse publicity.
In both the Federal Republic and Japan publicity of violations appears
to have been the most significant sanction imposed on the offender, and
the most effective deterrent. The use of publicity as a sanction not having
been carefully scrutinized in either country (or anywhere else), we know
too little to reach certain conclusions and can only offer some general,
speculative observations.
In the Federal Republic during the debate over the introduction of crim-
inal sanctions, those involved directly with antitrust enforcement were
unanimous in the opinion that aside from an increase in the maximum
fines no additional sanctions were necessary. Helmut Gutzler, as vice
president of the Federal Cartel Office, repeatedly asserted that adverse
publicity was not only the most effective sanction available, but also suf-
ficient to provide the necessary deterrent. 190 The current president, Wolf-
gang Kartte, apparently considers adverse publicity more important than
any monetary penalty and argues that the addition of criminal sanctions
could severely restrict the authorities' ability to use publicity effec-
tively, 191 apparently because of legal limitations on publicizing criminal
187. In a major price-fixing enforcement action brought by the Federal Cartel Office in the mid-
1970's, the chairman of the industry association argued on appeal that he did not even know that there
was an antitrust statute in Germany. Gutzler, supra note 37, at 530.
188. This conclusion is based on discussions with Japanese in-house corporate lawyers as well as
scholars, such as Kobe University Professor Setsuo Miyazawa, who have studied the growth of the
legal departments in major Japanese firms.
189. See, e.g., Steindorff, 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 6, at 22.
190. See Gutzler, 8 COMMISSION HEARINGS. supra note 16, app. 7, at 38; 10 id. app. 4, at 49;
Gutzler, Zur Begrandung und Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots, in WETTBEWERB IM WANDEL: FEsT-
SCHRIF FOR EBERHARD GONTHER 177 (1976); Gutzler, supra note 37, at 537.
191. Kartte &von Portius, supra note l,at 1171.
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actions.1 92 Giving credence to such views is the chorus of criticism over
the Federal Cartel Office's use of press releases and other forms of publi-
cizing administrative fine decisions. 193
The Japanese FTC also makes full use of publicity as a means of en-
forcement. Just the announcement of an FTC investigation may confirm
public suspicions about illicit business activity, or otherwise tarnish the
reputation of the offending firm being investigated. Adverse publicity in
turn may lead to political pressure on the firm to seek an accommodation
with the Commission. In addition, officials in the various ministries who
view their responsibility broadly to include oversight of industry activities
may become involved out of a desire to curtail improper activities of a
particular firm in order to protect the reputation of the industry as a
whole, or the ministry, or both. The reaction of MITI denouncing the
result of the Oil Cartel cases 194 illustrates the sensitivity of the economic
ministries to publicity of their role in the formation of covert cartels, thus
belying the impression by many foreign observers 195 that administrative
guidance to foster cartels is accepted generally in Japan as a legitimate
exercise of governmental power. Thus in recent years the Commission
seems to have made increasing use of the publicity tool for enforcement.
There is another facet to adverse publicity as a sanction in Japan.
Until the Commission issues its formal recommendation, the enforce-
ment process may be carried out with little public disclosure. Under arti-
cle 45(3), the Antitrust and Fair Trade Law currently requires the Com-
mission to notify the party reporting a violation of the decision to proceed
to a formal investigation. This requirement was not added to the statute
until 1977. Under regulations prior to 1977, the Commission was not re-
quired to inform the complainant although to do so was allowed and gen-
erally practiced. 196 Despite the apparent purpose to insure that the Com-
mission responds to complaints and thus to permit greater public scrutiny
of its handling of cases at a preliminary stage, the effect is as likely to be
an increase in the number of unreported cases dealt with informally, with
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Erlinghagen & Zippel, "Presseinformationen" des Bundes kartellamtes fiber
Bqfigeldfestsetzugen, 1973 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHR]Fr [NJW] 10 (sharply criticizing the
practices of the Federal Cartel Office). For a response to Erlinghagen & Zippel, see Scholz. Informa-
tionspolitik des Bundeskartellamts und Informationsrecht der Offentlichkeit. 1973 NJW 481. Scholz
cites a series of critical articles and replies thereto that appeared in the Handelsblatt (Commercial
news) in 1972.
194. See Tsusansh6 [MITI], Gv5sei shid5 ni tsuite no kangaekata o matomeru (Thoughts on
administrative guidance), 902 SHOJI HOMU 87 (1981), translated in Repeta, The Limits ofAdministra-
tive Authority in Japan: The Oil Cartel Criminal Cases and the Reaction of MITI and the FTC. 15
LAW IN JAPAN 24. 55-56 (1982).
195. See, e.g.. W. PAPE. supra note 70.
196. See Haley, supra note 94.
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officials delaying any formal report of the complaint until the matter has
been thoroughly considered internally. Several thousand complaints are
made to the Japanese FTC each year. Hardly more than 500 are fully
investigated. Of these no more than a handful result in formal deci-
sions. 197
Several concerns underlie the desire of the Commission to control pub-
lic information about a case. Some violations pose considerable political
problems for the Commission staff. This has been especially true in the
case of potential violations by banks and other financial institutions regu-
lated by the Ministry of Finance. The relationship between the Ministry
of Finance and Commissioners, many of whom were formerly Finance
officials, is quite close, and some cases are simply too controversial to
handle. The staff has an understandable if not laudable interest in prevent-
ing the agency from getting caught in a crossfire between consumer and
other organizations (especially those with political ties to the opposition
parties) and major ministries or the ruling party. A more legitimate con-
cern is that advance publicity about a pending investigation may ruin the
chances for successful prosecution. As explained above, the agency is
forced to rely in many instances on spot inspections and searches and
seizures to gather evidence of a violation. Publicity in such instances
forewarns and may lead to the destruction of vital documentation.
Publicity as a sanction raises two separate issues. The first is the di-
lemma of any liberal legal order: how can law enforcement be truly effec-
tive in a society with significant constitutional restraints on governmental
power? Yet without adequate means of enforcement how can the public
policies served by the law-including those limiting the government-
themselves be effectively maintained? If it is true that adverse publicity is
as meaningful a penalty as a fine, must its use be subject also to the
procedural restrictions applied to the imposition of other penalties to pro-
tect the citizens from arbitrary governmental action? The use of publicity,
for example, precludes even the most fundamental protection, such as
judicial review. Such questions are left unanswered by those who assert
that the enforcement authorities are obligated to provide the public with
information or consider that the procedural safeguards of the proceedings
being publicized provide adequate protection to the parties. 198
197. Id.
198. Both arguments are made by Scholz, supra note 193. Doubts over the probity of publicity
as a sanction have also been raised by Karsten Schmidt. K. SCHMIDT. KARTELLVERFAHRENSRECHT-
KARTELLVERWALTUNGSRECHT-BORGERLICHES REcHT 293 (1977). But see K. LODERSSEN, ERFAHRUNG
ALS RECHTSQUELLEn EINE FALLSTUDIE AUS DEM KARTELLSTRAFRECHT 206 (1972); K. TIEDEMANN, KAR-
TELLVERSTODE UND STRAFREcHT 34 (1976) (discussing the institutionalization of publicity as a formal
sanction).
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Whether concern over the "due process" implications of adverse pub-
licity are frivolous or deserve careful thought depends ultimately on how
serious a penalty adverse publicity imposes and how it functions as a
sanction. If publicity is not in fact a significant penalty or one that cannot
be made subject to legal control, further discussion seems pointless. Un-
fortunately, even these fundamental questions remain unexplored. In Ja-
pan, the argument can be made that loss of reputation functions as a sub-
stitute for formal legal sanctions throughout the legal system and can be
viewed both as a contributing factor and consequence of the inadequacy
of the formal institutionalized system to provide effective sanctions and
legal relief;199 whether reality conforms to such theorizing awaits future
research. In the Federal Republic, however, the issue is apparently hardly
even raised. 200 More is at stake, says Helmut Gutzler, 201 than corporate
"image," but what that is remains unanswered.
199. See generally Haley, supra note 51.
200. K. LUDERSSEN. supra note 198, at 207 (attempting a brief explanation based apparently on
G. KATONA. PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1951)).
201. Gutzler, supra note 37, at 537.
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